



J. H. H. H.
1952

A
VINDICATION

O F

Mr. *LOCKE*,

FROM THE

CHARGE of giving Encouragement
to SCEPTICISM and INFIDELITY,
and from several other Mistakes and
Objections of the Learned AUTHOR
of the Procedure, Extent, and Limits
of HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

In Six DIALOGUES.

Wherein is likewise Enquired,
Whether Mr. *LOCKE*'s True Opinion of the
Soul's Immateriality was not mistaken by the
late Learned Mon^r. *LEIBNITZ*.

Humani nihil à me alienum puto. TER.

By VIN. PERRONET, A. M. Vicar
of *Shoreham* in *Kent*, and Chaplain to the
Right Honourable Earl *STANHOPE*.

L O N D O N :

Printed for JAMES, JOHN, and PAUL KNAPTON, at
the Crown in *Ludgate-Street*. MDCCXXXVI.

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

100

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

the first of these is the fact that the
 of the second is the fact that the

The CONTENTS.

D I A L O G U E I. <i>Mr. Locke did not doubt, whether the Soul was not material, and perishable ; — nor of the Soul's being an immaterial Substance.</i>	Page 2—5
<i>He only doubted whether this was capable of strict Demonstration ; but it does not follow from hence that he doubted of the Immateriality itself.</i>	5, 6
<i>It is submitted, whether he could doubt of that, which he judged probable to the highest Degree ; and without which he was convinced he could have no Sensations.</i>	6
<i>The Author of the Philosophical Dissertations suspects, that Mr. Locke supposed some Matter was cogitative.</i>	ibid.
<i>No manner of Reason for this Suspicion.</i>	7
<i>His Essay on Human Understanding, called by the Author of the Procedure, the Boast of a sceptical and unbelieving Age.</i>	8
<i>In what manner Mr. Locke has recommended himself to Sceptics and Infidels.</i>	8—14
<i>His Account of Revelation, Faith, and Miracles.</i>	8, 9
<i>Of the Deity.</i>	9
<i>Of a Future State.</i>	9, 10
<i>What Knowledge we have of our own Existence, of a Deity, and of other Beings.</i>	10—13
<i>Morality capable of Demonstration.</i>	13
<i>The proper Science and Employment of Mankind in general.</i>	13, 14
<i>Mr. Locke called Idea-Monger, and charged with shackling and fettering the Mind, — with tying it down altogether to Objects of Sensation, and by necessary Consequence destroying Religion.</i>	14, 15
<i>What Foundation there is for this heavy Charge.</i>	15—17
<i>Such Representations not like to reform a sceptical and unbelieving Age.</i>	18
(b)	Mr.

The CONTENTS.

<i>Mr. Locke has given the highest Proof of the sincerest Respect for Revelation.</i>	18, 19
<i>An Appeal how justly he is used.</i>	ibid.

DIAL. II. <i>Mr. Locke's Ideas of Reflection charged with being destructive to Knowledge and Religion.</i>	20
<i>A strange Fatality attends every Thing he says.</i>	21
<i>What he understands by an Idea.</i>	22
<i>Men of Learning pleased with an empty gingling of Ideas.</i>	23
<i>The not being able to talk or think without Ideas, no manner of Fault.</i>	23, 24
<i>Mr. Locke's Account how we come by the Idea of Power, insulted without Reason.</i>	24, 25
<i>Charged with supposing Ideas to be in Things without us, contrary to his own repeated Declaration.</i>	25, 26
<i>The Mind's active Power, rendred the Mind Changes.</i>	26
<i>Mr. Locke's Account of Power far from being injurious to creating Power; since the reflecting on the active Powers of the Mind may lead us to it.</i>	27
<i>No Reason for so many Suppositions against Mr. Locke's Notion of Power.</i>	28
<i>The being conscious of Pain or Pleasure no Hindrance to the having Ideas of them.</i>	28, 29
<i>Mr. Locke's Ideas, and the Author of the Procedure's Conceptions differ in Sound.</i>	30
<i>Whether the Mind squints more in framing Ideas, than in framing Conceptions.</i>	30, 31
<i>The Operations of the Mind become Ideas by the Mind's reflecting on them.</i>	31
<i>They are not their own Ideas, but the Ideas of the Mind.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Account of an Idea very liable to Exception.</i>	33, 34
<i>Idea in its strictest Acceptation no more applicable</i>	to

The CONTENTS.

<i>to some Perceptions of the Senses, than to the Operations of the Mind.</i>	35
<i>The Term Idea persecuted.</i>	36
<i>Of as known and fixt a Meaning, when applied to the Operations of the Mind, as when applied to the Objects of Sense.</i>	ibid.
<i>Discerning the Operations of our Minds, no Hindrance to our having Ideas of those Operations.</i>	37
<i>The Ideas of Reflection direct, immediate, simple, and original.</i>	38, 39
<i>The Reasons given by the Author of the Procedure, why the Perceptions of all the five Senses must be Ideas, by no means conclusive.</i>	39, 40

DIAL. III. <i>The Author of the Procedure's Account of Substance in opposition to Mr. Locke's.</i>	42, 43
<i>Though we can know no more of a Substance at one single View, than the Object can imprint upon the Sense, or the Sense is framed to receive; yet this is no Proof against what Mr. Locke has maintained in relation to our Ideas of Substances.</i>	44
<i>Mr. Locke's Reasons for calling them complex, indistinct, inadæquate, and imperfect.</i>	43, 44
<i>These hinder not our Idea of Sound from being clear and distinct, simple and adæquate.</i>	44, 45
<i>Mr. Locke's Method of framing general Ideas, and that of the Author of the Procedure.</i>	46
<i>The Author of the Procedure seems to mistake Mr. Locke's Method.</i>	47
<i>And calls it an inconsistent Monster.</i>	ibid.
<i>Discovered to have no Inconsistency in it.</i>	47—49
<i>General abstract Ideas, considered as such, exist only in the Mind.</i>	49
<i>They imply no Contradiction.</i>	49—51
<i>An hypothetical Syllogism against Mr. Locke's Ideas of Reflection.</i>	51
<i>A second against his Maxim, that our Knowledge reaches no farther than our Ideas.</i>	52

The CONTENTS.

<i>What the Author of the Procedure means by Ideas in the last Syllogism, something doubtful.</i>	52, 53
<i>He seems to maintain, in different Words the same Thing with Mr. Locke.</i>	54, 55
<i>The Triumphs of the Author of the Procedure on Account of his Syllogisms.</i>	56
<i>Issue joined with him upon the Strength of them.</i>	ibid.

DIAL. IV. <i>Mr. Locke is charged with a shameful Absurdity and Contradiction.</i>	58
<i>What he says of our having the Idea of active Power from Spirit, very uncandidly represented.</i>	58—60
<i>We can have no Idea of active Power, according to the Author of the Procedure, from an immaterial Substance, though he seems to allow we may have it from an immaterial Being.</i>	60
<i>A Supposition of Mr. Locke in relation to the Word Spirit spreads Confusion in our Thoughts and Language, in one Place, and is confirmed in three others.</i>	61
<i>An absurd Notion charged on Mr. Locke, but not easy to guess what is meant by it.</i>	63
<i>He could not be led into a profound Error for want of making a Distinction which the Author of the Procedure supposes.</i>	63, 64
<i>Another Charge of Contradiction brought against Mr. Locke.</i>	64
<i>No Manner of Foundation for it.</i>	64, 65
<i>An immaterial Substance no harder to be united to Body, than a Faculty of Thinking.</i>	65
<i>A short Way of confuting Mr. Locke's monstrous Position,——That we have as clear an Idea of Spirit as we have of Body.</i>	66
<i>A second Argument against it.</i>	ibid.
<i>He is charged with shameful Inconsistency.</i>	67
<i>The Author of the Procedure seems to mistake Mr. Locke's Hypothesis.</i>	67, 68
	It

The C O N T E N T S.

<i>It does not follow from Mr. Locke, that we must have a clear Knowledge of all created Spirits.</i>	68
<i>He is far from supposing that an immaterial Substance is a Solecism and Contradiction.</i>	69
<i>Whether pure Spirit be extended or not, we still know many Properties of it, and are ignorant of many relating to Body.</i>	70
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Hypothesis, in Relation to the Thinking of Matter, compared with Mr. Locke's.</i>	72, 73
<i>Thinking the sole Act of an immaterial Substance.</i>	73, 74
<i>No Occasion for Thinking to be the Act of Matter and Spirit, in order to constitute one and the same Man.</i>	74, 75
<i>To suppose a pure Spirit thinks, an extravagant Thought according to the Author of the Procedure.</i>	75
<i>This neither proved from their being devoid of Matter, or their Knowledge being instantaneous.</i>	76
<i>Whether a pure Spirit can think without Thinking.</i>	76, 77
<i>He that comprehends this, nothing in the occult Metaphysics can be too hard for him.</i>	77
 D I A L. V. <i>Mr. Locke found fault with for applying negative Infinity to God.</i>	
<i>He makes a Difference between Infinity, when applied to the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, and when applied to other Things.</i>	80, 81
<i>By infinite Power &c. he means what is absolutely perfect.</i>	81, 82
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Account of our Knowledge of the Deity and divine Things.</i>	83—85
<i>He dislikes all Attempts towards demonstrating the Being of a God, and the Truth of Natural Religion.</i>	86, 87
<i>The Privilege of some Writers above others.</i>	87
	Mr.

The CONTENTS.

<i>Mr. Locke's Reasons why Morality may be demonstrated.</i>	87, 88
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Reasons, why the Being of a God cannot be demonstrated.</i>	88
<i>A strange Power in Infinite to alter the very Nature of Things.</i>	89
<i>The same Power in Analogy.</i>	91
<i>Mr. Locke charged with giving a most shocking Account of the Deity</i>	92
<i>His Misfortune deplored.</i>	ibid.
<i>A Reason offered, why he is so severely used.</i>	ibid.
<i>Language without a Meaning not proper to convince Mankind.</i>	92, 93
<i>The Sentiments of a celebrated Writer, in relation to the Analogical Attributes of God.</i>	93
<i>Mr. Locke's Idea of the Happiness of God, not borrowed from the Gratification of Appetites, Passions, and Desires.</i>	94, 95
<i>A detestable false Maxim of Mr. Locke.</i>	95
<i>Mr. Locke no where speaks irreverently of the divine Essence.</i>	96
<i>A Reader ought to know, whether the Charge we bring against an Author be his express Doctrine or not.</i>	ibid.
<i>To cite the particular Places we refer to, is sometimes at least, a very just and useful Method.</i>	97

DIAL. VI. *Mr. Locke's Opinion of some Brute Animals.*

<i>Brutes affirmed to be mere Matter, and their Motions compared, by the Author of the Procedure, to the Motion of a Clock.</i>	98, 99
<i>That Author has Recourse to the Power of God, the very Thing, for which Mr. Locke is rebuked.</i>	100
<i>Sensitive Perception, according to the Author of the Procedure, essential to Brutes, as they are a particular System of Matter, &c.</i>	101

The CONTENTS.


<i>Atoms in a particular Direction will as soon produce Liberty of Will.</i>	101
<i>The Author of the Procedure's sensitive Perception, and Mr. Locke's superadded Faculty of Thinking, differ greatly.</i>	101, 102
<i>Brutes allowed by that Author a simple Perception, but not a simple Apprehension.</i>	102
<i>The Difference between perceiving and apprehending.</i>	103
<i>The bare Reception of the Images of Things differs widely from the perceiving of them.</i>	ibid.
<i>This last requires more than Matter.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Account of the Sensations and Perceptions of Brutes.</i>	104
<i>Not easy to be understood.</i>	104, 105
<i>What it is that moves and directs their Motions.</i>	106, 107
<i>They are made mere Machines.</i>	108
<i>And yet those are condemned, who make Machines of them.</i>	108, 109
<i>The Author of the Procedure guilty again of what he condemns in Mr. Locke.</i>	109
<i>The Description given of Brutes by that Author, makes nothing else of them but Machines.</i>	ibid.
<i>Zeal ill timed.</i>	111
<i>Raillery that may please the Materialists.</i>	ibid.
<i>There may be immaterial Principles, which we know not how to dispose of.</i>	ibid.
<i>Advocates for Brutes charged with Extreams.</i>	112
<i>Brutes being led by Instinct in some Things, no Argument they are led by the same Principle in all.</i>	113, 114
<i>No Cause of Virtue answered by supposing Mankind the lowest Rank of all Creatures, endued with Reason.</i>	114, 115
<i>An Opinion or two of the Learned Descartes taken notice of.</i>	115, 116
<i>There</i>	

The CONTENTS.

<i>There may be Reason and proper Organs, without articulate Sounds.</i>	116, 117
<i>A Blunder charged upon Mr. Locke, which no way belongs to him.</i>	117, 118
<i>Divine Revelation a decisive Proof.</i>	118
<i>The Author of the Procedure's Proof from Scripture, that Brutes are mere Matter.</i>	119
<i>The Learned Mercer against his Criticism.</i>	120
<i>Our Salvation no more depends on knowing Matter thinks, than on the Principles of Astronomy.</i>	121
<i>Scripture often made use of to prove what it was not designed to prove.</i>	121, 122
<i>We should be careful not to confound our Interpretation of Scripture with Scripture itself.</i>	122
<i>The Materiality of the Souls of Brutes affirmed to be as clearly revealed as the Immateriality of the Souls of Men, and to have the same Support, as the Truths of Natural and Revealed Religion.</i>	122, 123
<i>And yet elsewhere declared to be Matter of highly probable Conjecture only.</i>	123
<i>How far that Learned Author's Method may serve the Interest of Religion.</i>	124
<i>He charges some anonymous Writer with discovering a feverish burning Zeal.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Conclusion.</i>	

ERRATA.

PAGE 4. at the bottom, for p. 64, 65. read p. 67, 75. p. 5. l. 3. for *Again*, read, *Part of the Chapter here referred to, is what follows.*
Ibid. at the bottom, for *His first Letter*, &c. read, *His third Letter*, p. 430. — p. 6. at the bottom, after *His first Letter*, add p. 33. p. 7. l. 10. for *in* read *by*. p. 50. at the bottom, for p. 62. read p. 46. — p. 63. at the bottom, after *H. Understanding*, B. 2. c. 23. &c. add *See also his first Letter to Bishop Stillingfleet*, p. 9, 10, 34, 35, 58, 65. — p. 64. at the bottom, dele p. 64. p. 67. at the bottom, for p. 64, 65. read p. 66. *Ibid.* after p. 204. add, *See Mr. Locke's first Letter to Bishop Stillingfleet*. p. 72, 73. — p. 97. l. 1. for *thence*, read, *whence*. p. 99. l. 17. for *should make*, read, *should not make*.



T H E
P R E F A C E.



It may seem a little surprizing, that so clear and accurate a Writer as Mr. *Locke*, should have been so frequently misunderstood; and that an Author should be so often unkindly treated, whose Works breath so noble a Spirit:—The profoundest Veneration for the awful Majesty of God, and the justest Concern for the Rights and Liberties of Men:—The most affectionate Regard and Love for Truth, sound Morality, and divine Revelation.—But such has been the Misfortune of that Gentleman; and such the Fate of his Writings! What this should be ascribed to; every Person must judge for himself.

However esteeming Mr. *Locke* as one of the finest Genius's of the Age he lived in, a sincere Christian and an Honour to his Country, I thought it an Office of common Humanity, to free his Meaning from some

The P R E F A C E.

considerable Mistakes, and to vindicate his Memory from several groundless Suggestions: — Since he was no longer able to explain or defend himself.

A Man's being dead, should not indeed prove a Protection to his Errors, nor prevent their being laid open and exposed to the World. This is an Immunity, that no Person's Errors whatever should be entitled to. They ought by all means to be made a Sacrifice to Truth. But then Care should be taken, that we do not in the Heat of Controversy, instead of *Error*, sacrifice *something* else.

Mr. *Locke* certainly neither was, nor did he ever pretend to be, infallible. But how far those numberless Objections, raised against him by a late Learned Author,* are either well supported, or appear to be the mere Effects of an unprejudiced and dispassionate Mind, is referred to the impartial Judgment of every intelligent Reader.

P. S. It will be proper to mention, that Mr. *Locke's* Letters, referred to in the following Dialogues, are the Octavo Edition.

* See the Procedure, &c. of Human Understanding.



A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. *LOCKE*, &c.

DIALOGUE I.

CRITES and PHILANDER.

Crit.



GOOD morrow, my dear
Friend *Philander*.

Phil. Dear *Crites*, good
morrow.

C. You see I am come according to appointment, to have a long Conversation, relating to my old Friend Mr. *Locke*.—I really think, *Philander*, I love Truth; and would willingly embrace it, wherever I found it. For which reason, I am neither attached to Ancients or Moderns: and even Those I have formerly admired, I immediately desert, when Others appear to me, to be more in the right. And therefore, if I should

B

trouble

trouble you with various Objections against my old Favourite, you must neither be surprized, nor displeased.

P. Notwithstanding the Value, *Crites*, I have for his Memory, I have yet a much greater for Truth; and therefore am always ready to give Him up, whenever I find that Truth is against Him.

C. And I promise for my own part, to give up every Objection, which can be fully and clearly answered.

P. Well, *Crites*, Preliminaries being thus settled, be so good as to begin with your Objections.

C. In the first place then, *Philander*, I desire to observe, that a very great Philosopher, I mean the late learned Monsieur *Leibnitz*, who was no enemy to Mr *Locke*, did however charge Him with *doubting at least, whether the Soul be not Material, and naturally Perishable**.

P. I hope, *Crites*, it will appear, that That learned Writer was actually mistaken; and that Mr. *Locke* had no Doubt of the Soul's Immateriality; but only whether That Immateriality was capable of strict Demonstration. For the Section, which that learned Writer had certainly in View, is part of a Chapter, which is entirely taken up in treating of the Extent of Human Knowledge. "I am not speaking, says "Mr. *Locke*, of Probability, but Knowledge; "——the State we are at present in, not being "That of Vision, we must, in many Things, content ourselves with Faith and Probability. And

* See his first Letter to her present Majesty. § 2.

“ in the present Question, about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at *Demonstrative Certainty*, we need not think it strange.” *

C. But does he not expressly say ;——“ It is true, we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know ; whether any *mere Material Being* thinks or no ? ” †

P. Supposing, *Crites*, that This Sentence stood alone, without any Explanation whatever ; would it be reasonable to suppose Mr. *Locke* doubted, whether *mere Matter* might not think ; who maintains that it is neither capable of *Sense*, or *Thought*, or *Self-motion* || ? Or can it be conceived, that One who is *convinced*, that our Sensations *cannot be the Action of bare, insensible Matter* ** ; that he should doubt, whether This very *Matter* might not be capable of These very Sensations ?

C. Indeed he immediately adds, “ That it is impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a Power to perceive and think, or else joined, and fixed to Matter so disposed, a Thinking, Immaterial Substance ‡.” But still he appears doubtful, whether the Soul be such a Substance, or not.

P. When You hear him a little further, *Crites*, I hope You will be satisfied, that he entertained no such Doubts.——“ By putting toge-

* Human Understanding. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. † Ibid.

|| B. 2. c. 21. § 4. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. c. 10. § 10. ** B. 2. c. 23. § 15. Jan. Edition. ‡ B. 4. c. 3. § 10.

4 *A Vindication of Mr. LOCKE, &c.*

“ther, says Mr. *Locke*, the Ideas of Think-
 “ing, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of mo-
 “ving Themselves and other Things, we have
 “as clear a Perception and Notion of Immate-
 “rial Substances, as we have of Material.” *
 “It being no more a Contradiction, that Think-
 “ing should exist separate and independent from
 “Solidity, than it is a Contradiction, that
 “Solidity should exist separate and independent
 “from Thinking; —I know not, why we
 “may not as well allow a thinking Thing,
 “without Solidity, *i. e.* Immaterial to exist, as
 “a solid Thing without Thinking, *i. e.* Matter
 “to exist; especially since it is no harder to
 “conceive, how Thinking should exist without
 “Matter, than how Matter should think.” †

In another place, speaking of Consciousness,
 —“I agree the more probable Opinion is,
 “that This Consciousness is annexed to, and
 “the Affection of, one Individual, Immaterial,
 “Substance.” ‡

Let us next hear him explain himself to his
 learned Antagonist, the Bishop of *Worcester*.
 “It cannot, says he, be *infallibly demonstrated*
 “*from our Ideas*, whether the Thinking Sub-
 “stance [within us] be material or immaterial;
 “though from Them it may be proved, that it
 “is *to the highest Degree probable*, that it is Im-
 “material.” *** And he gives this Reason to his
 Lordship, for applying the Idea of Spirit in
 the strictest Sense to the Soul; —“The easily
 “conceivable Possibility, nay *Great Probability*,

* B. 2. c. 23. § 15.

† B. 2. c. 23. § 32.

‡ B. 2. c. 27. § 25.

*** His First Letter to the Bi-
 shop of *Worcester*. P. 64, 65.

“that

“ that the Thinking Substance in us is Immaterial, giving me sufficient Ground for it.” *
 — Again, “ Whilst I know by seeing or hearing, that there is some corporeal Being without me, the Object of that Sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some Spiritual Being within me, that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the Action of bare, insensible Matter; nor ever could be without an *Immaterial, Thinking Being*.” †

Do These seem, *Crites*, to be the Sentiments of a Man, who *doubted*, whether the Soul might not be *Material, and naturally Perishable*? That he questioned whether the Immateriality of its Substance could be *infallibly demonstrated from our own Ideas*, is certain; though a late learned Writer has fairly proved it to be so ‖. But that he therefore *doubted*, whether the Soul was an Immaterial Substance, does by no means follow. For if we apprehend that Mr. *Locke* was doubtful of every thing, but what he thought capable of strict Demonstration, he will himself abundantly satisfy us, that we are mistaken.—“ However true, says he, it may be, that all the intelligent Spirits that God ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make a Part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like Propositions we may assent to, as highly probable; but are not, I fear in this State, capable of knowing.” ** Again, “ That there are De-

* His first Letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*. P. 64, 65.

† B. 2. c. 23. Sect 25. Last Edition. ‖ See Dr. *Clarke's* Letters to Mr. *Dodwell* and Mr. *Collins* upon this Subject.

** B. 4. c. 11. § 12.

6 *A Vindication of Mr. LOCKE, &c,*

“ grees of Spiritual Beings between us and the
 “ Great God, who is there, that by his own
 “ search and ability, can come to *know?*” * And
 yet elsewhere he says, “ That there should be
 “ more Species of Intelligent Creatures above
 “ us, than there are of Sensible and Material
 “ below us, is probable to me,” &c. †.

And in another place,——“ It cannot be
 “ doubted, but there are distinct Species of se-
 parate Spirits.” ‖

That This was the very case with that Gentleman, in respect of the Soul’s Immateriality, appears to me perfectly evident. For though he thought it could not be *infallibly demonstrated from our own Ideas*, that the Soul was an Immaterial Substance; yet he maintains it may be proved from Them, that This is *probable to the highest Degree*. And therefore, how Mr. Locke can in reason be supposed to *doubt* of That Immateriality, which he thus judged to the *highest Degree probable*; Nay, whilst he declares himself *convinced* that his *Sensations could not be without an Immaterial, Thinking Being*;——This is what, *Critics*, I shall venture to leave with your own Thoughts.

And now I shall beg leave to take Notice of a great Mistake of another very ingenious Writer, who plainly intimates his suspicion that Mr. Locke supposed *Some Matter* might be *Cogitative*. “ Why should an Author, says he, use
 “ such limitative terms, as *bare, pure, incogitative*
 “ *Matter*, if he did not suppose *some Matter* might

* B. 4. c. 3. § 27.
 so, B. 2. c. 2. § 3.

† B. 3. c. 6. § 12. See al-
 ‖ His first Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

“be *Cogitative*?”* I hope it must appear demonstrably evident, from what we have already observed out of Mr. *Locke*, that he did not suppose any *Matter* whatever, to be of itself, or in its own Nature, *Cogitative*; but as directly the contrary, as Words can make it.—Tho’ had Mr. *Locke* never maintained that “*Matter is evidently, in its own Nature, void of Sense and Thought,*”† Had he never expressly affirmed that “*Matter, in its own Strength, cannot produce in itself so much as Motion,*”‡ would there however have been sufficient Reason, from his using such Terms as *bare, pure, incogitative Matter*, to ground such a Suspicion upon? Nothing surely could have been more Forced or Unnatural. But to suggest any Thing of this Kind, against the plainest Evidence an Author could give to the contrary, is really surprizing; especially in a Gentleman, who seems to have read Mr. *Locke*, with no small Pleasure and Attention.—Let any one, *Critics*, reflect with himself, whether he can think of any Terms, more *Suitable, Just, or Proper*, by which to express the True Nature of *Mere Matter*; which is evidently what Mr. *Locke* means:—And then let him judge, whether the Fate of some Writers be not extremely hard, when the very *Propriety* of their Language is turned against them.

C. I shall proceed now, *Philander*, to a learned Author, who furnishes me with an almost inexhaustible Stock of Objections against my old Friend.—And First, I desire to take Notice, that in my Opinion, he rightly charges Mr. *Locke*’s

* The Philosophical Dissertations of Dr. *Watts*. P. 62—301.

† B. 4. c. 3. § 6. || B. 4. c. 10. § 10.

8 *A Vindication of Mr. LOCKE, &c.*

Essay, which he calls a *Metaphysical Castle in the Air*, with having been *much the Vain and Empty Boast of This Sceptical and Unbelieving Age* *.

P. I shall not dispute the learned Author's Authority to dignify That Essay, in what manner he thought proper.—But if a *Sceptical and Unbelieving Age*, make their *Boast of This Castle in the Air*; They cannot, I think, give plainer Proof, that They know very little of it.—And as some parts of This *Airy Building* seem, *Critics*, to have slipped out of your own Memory; permit me to recall to your Thoughts, in how very Ample a manner, your *old Friend* has recommended himself to *Sceptics and Infidels*.—In this very Essay, speaking of Divine Revelation and Faith, he observes that “ There is one
“ sort of Propositions, that challenge the *highest*
“ Degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony;
“ whether the Thing proposed agree or disagree
“ with common Experience, and the Ordinary
“ Course of Things, or no. The Reason whereof
“ is, because the Testimony is of such a One,
“ as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that
“ is, of God Himself. This carries with it,
“ Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond
“ Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name,
“ *Revelation*, and our Assent to it, *Faith*; which
“ has as much *Certainty* as our *Knowledge* itself;
“ and we may as well doubt of our own Being,
“ as we can, whether any Revelation from God
“ be true. So that Faith is a Settled and Sure
“ Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves
“ no manner of Room for Doubt or Hesitation.”

* Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding.

—Again, “Faith is nothing else but an Assent
 “founded on the highest Reason.”*—In another
 Place, he tells us,——“Reason is not in-
 “jured or disturbed, but assisted and improved,
 “by New Discoveries of Truth, coming from
 “the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge.—
 “Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to
 “over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and
 “Interests, and hath a Right to be received
 “with a full Assent.”†—And speaking of
Miracles, he says, “which well attested, do not
 “only find Credit Themselves; but give it also
 “to other Truths, which need such Confirma-
 “tion.‡” Concerning the Deity, he thus ex-
 presses himself,——“Who, it is certain, is
 “infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of
 “His Nature, from the Highest and Perfectest
 “of all Created Beings, much more from what
 “our Narrow Understandings can conceive of
 “Him, than the greatest Man, nay purest Se-
 “raphim, is from the most contemptible Part
 “of Matter.”** In another Place,——“Who
 “knows all Things, past, present, and to come,
 “and to whom the Thoughts of Men’s Hearts
 “always lie open.”† “The Knowledge and
 “Veneration of Him, being the Chief End of
 “all our Thoughts, and the proper Business of
 “all Understandings.*†” As to our Future
 Condition, These are his words,——“It is evi-
 “dent, that He, who made us at first begin
 “to subsist here, Sensible, Intelligent Beings,
 “and for several Years continued us in such a

* B. 4. c. 16. § 14.

‡ B. 4. c. 16. § 13.

† B. 2. c. 10. § 9.

† B. 4. c. 18. § 12.

** B. 3. c. 6. § 11.

* † B. 2. c. 7. § 6.

“ State, can and will restore us to the like State
 “ of Sensibility in another world; and make us
 “ capable there to receive the Retribution he
 “ has designed for Men, according to their Do-
 “ ings in this Life.” *——And elsewhere he ob-
 serves, that “ Men cannot but see, that a State
 “ of Eternal durable Joys after This Life, far
 “ surpassing all the Good to be found here, is
 “ more possible, than the Attainment and Con-
 “ tinuation of that Pittance of Honour, Rich-
 “ es, or Pleasure, which they pursue, and for
 “ which They neglect That Eternal State.” †

Thus much, *Crites*, for the *Infidelity* of This
Metaphysical Castle in the Air. Let us next ex-
 amine what Support it gives to *Scepticism*. In
 general then, Mr. *Locke* maintains, that “ we
 “ have the Knowledge of Our Existence by
 “ Intuition; of the Existence of God by De-
 “ monstration; and of Other Things by Sensa-
 “ tion.” ‖ As to the First, he affirms, that
 “ we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly,
 “ that it neither needs, nor is capable of any
 “ Proof.—If I doubt of all other Things,
 “ that very Doubt makes me perceive my own
 “ Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of
 “ That.—Experience then convinces us, that
 “ we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own
 “ Existence, and an internal infallible Perception,
 “ that we are.” ‡ ——“ He that can doubt,
 “ whether he be any Thing or no, I speak not
 “ to, no more than I would argue with pure
 “ Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-En-

* B. 4. c. 3. § 6.
 B. 2. c. 7. § 5. c. 21. § 70.
 † Ibid § 3.

† B. 2. c. 21. § 44. See also
 ‖ B. 4. c. 9. § 2.

“ tity, that it were Something. If any one pre-
 “ tend to be so *Sceptical*, as to deny his own
 “ Existence, (for really to doubt of it, is mani-
 “ festly impossible) let him, for me, enjoy his
 “ beloved Happiness of being Nothing, untill
 “ Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of
 “ the contrary.”*——As to the Existence of a
 God, he maintains in one Place, that “ there is
 “ no Truth, which a Man may more evidently
 “ make out to himself.”†

In another, having proved that there must be
 an Eternal, most Powerful, and most Knowing
 Being, he adds,——“ From what has been said,
 “ it is plain to me, we have a more certain
 “ Knowledge of the Existence of a God, than
 “ of any Thing our Senses have not immediate-
 “ ly discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may
 “ say, that we more certainly know, that there
 “ is a God, than that there is any Thing else
 “ without us.”‡——As to the Knowledge of
 other Things, which he says we have by Sensa-
 tion, he thus observes upon it.——“ There is,
 “ indeed, another *Perception* of the Mind, em-
 “ ployed about the *particular Existence of finite*
 “ *Beings* without us; which going beyond bare
 “ Probability, and yet not reaching perfectly
 “ to either of the foregoing Degrees of Cer-
 “ tainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.
 “ ——There can be nothing more certain, than
 “ that the *Idea* we receive from an external Ob-
 “ ject, is in our Minds; This is intuitive Know-
 “ ledge. But whether there be any thing more
 “ than barely that *Idea* in our Minds; whether

* B. 4. c. 10. § 2. † B. 1. c. 4. § 22.

‡ B. 4. c. 10. § 1—6.

“ we can thence certainly infer the Existence of
 “ any thing without us, which corresponds to
 “ that *Idea*, is that, whereof some Men think,
 “ there may be a Question made; because Men
 “ may have such *Ideas* in their Minds, when no
 “ Such Thing exists, no Such Object affects
 “ their Senses. But yet here, I think, we are
 “ provided with an Evidence, that puts us past
 “ doubting: For I ask any one, whether he be
 “ not invincibly conscious to himself of a diffe-
 “ rent Perception, when he looks on the Sun
 “ by Day, and thinks on it by Night; when he
 “ actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose,
 “ or only thinks on that Savour or Odour?
 “ We as plainly find the Difference there is be-
 “ tween any *Idea* revived in our Minds by our
 “ own Memory, and actually coming into our
 “ Minds by our Senses, as we do between any
 “ two distinct *Ideas*. If any one say a Dream
 “ may do the Same Thing, and all these *Ideas*
 “ may be produced in us, without any External
 “ Objects, he may please to dream, that I make
 “ him this Answer. 1. That it is no great mat-
 “ ter, whether I remove his Scruple or no:
 “ Where all is but Dream, Reasoning and Ar-
 “ gument are of no Use, Truth and Knowledge
 “ Nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a
 “ very manifest Difference between Dreaming
 “ of being in a Fire, and being actually in it.
 “ But yet if he be resolved to appear so *Scepti-*
 “ *cal*, as to maintain, that what I call being
 “ actually in the Fire, is Nothing but a Dream;
 “ and that we cannot thereby certainly know,
 “ that any such Thing as Fire actually exists
 “ without us;—I answer that we certainly
 “ find, that Pleasure or Pain follows upon
 “ the

“ the Application of certain Objects to us,
 “ whose Existence we perceive, or dream that
 “ we perceive, by our Senses ; This Certainty
 “ is as great as our Happiness or Misery ; be-
 “ yond which we have no Concernment to
 “ Know, or to Be.” *

Again, “ The *Idea* of a Supream Being, In-
 “ finite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom,
 “ whose Workmanship we are, and on whom
 “ we depend ; and the *Idea* of Ourselves, as
 “ Understanding, Rational Creatures, being Such
 “ as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly
 “ considered and pursued, afford such Foundati-
 “ ons of our Duty and Rules of Action, as
 “ might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capa-
 “ ble of Demonstration* ; wherein I doubt not,
 “ but from Principles, as incontestable as Those
 “ of the Mathematics, by necessary Consequen-
 “ ces, the Measures of Right and Wrong might
 “ be made out, to any one that will apply him-
 “ self with the same Indifferency and Attention
 “ to the One, as he does to the Other of these
 “ Sciences.” †——And to mention only One
 place more,——“ Since our Faculties, says
 “ Mr. *Locke*, are not fitted to penetrate into the
 “ internal Fabric and real Essences of Bodies ;
 “ but yet plainly discover to us the Being of a
 “ God, and the Knowledge of Ourselves, enough
 “ to lead us into a full and clear Discovery of
 “ our Duty, and great Concernment ; it will
 “ become us, as Rational Creatures to employ
 “ Those Faculties we have, about what They
 “ are most adapted to, and follow the Direction
 “ of Nature, where it seems to point us out

* B. 4. c. 2. § 14. † B. 4. c. 3. § 13.

“ the way. For it is rational to conclude, that
 “ our proper Employment lies in Those Enqui-
 “ ries, and in that Sort of Knowledge, which is
 “ most suited to our Natural Capacities, and
 “ carries in it our greatest Interest, *i. e.* the
 “ Condition of our Eternal Estate: and there-
 “ fore it is, I think, that *Morality is the proper*
 “ *Science, and Business of Mankind in General;*
 “ who are both concerned, and fitted to search
 “ out their *Summum Bonum.*”*

Behold, *Crites*, some Parts of *That Metaphysical Cattle*, which has been so much the *Vain and Empty Boast of a Sceptical and Unbelieving Age!*

C. Pray Philander, let us consider what our learned Author mentions a few Pages further; and perhaps you may not find the Charge so very ill supported, as you seem to apprehend.

He there observes, that “ all our *Idea-Mon-*
 “ *gers* were daily loading the Mind with Fetters
 “ and Shackles, lest it should make any Attempt
 “ to move one Step farther than *Secular Know-*
 “ *ledge*; and that if the Mind of Man could
 “ exert itself no Farther, there would not be
 “ the least Room left for any Knowledge of
 “ *Religion* Natural or Revealed.—That ac-
 “ cording to Their Fundamental Principle,—
 “ If our Words do not stand for Ideas, They
 “ are Sounds and Nothing else; That the Mind
 “ neither doth nor can extend itself farther
 “ than *They* do: and that where we have no I-
 “ deas, our Reasoning stops, and we are at the
 “ End of our Reckoning.”† “ It is plain,
 “ says our Author, that the Mind is tied down

* B. 4. c. 12. § 11. See also B. 1. c. 1. § 5.

† See Mr. *Locke's* H. Understanding. B. 4. c. 17. § 9.

“ alto-

“altogether to Objects of Sensation; of which
 “ONLY, as we have seen, it can properly speak-
 “ing have *Direct* and *Immediate Ideas*.—A-
 “gain, Though the Men who lay down These
 “Positions, do not *Expressly*, or in *Profession*,
 “renounce all *Natural Religion* at least; yet
 “they plainly destroy even *This*, by Immediate
 “Necessary Consequence; whilst under the Co-
 “lour of adhering to the Strictest Sense, and
 “Reason, and Evidence, They lay an *Injurious*
 “and *Unnatural* Restraint upon the Understand-
 “ing, and tie it down to the Objects or Ideas
 “of *Sensation* only; or at Most, to *Those Things*
 “of which we have *Direct* and *Immediate Ideas*
 “or Conceptions.”*

P. What the learned Author can mean by
Those Things in the last Clause, I profess, *Crites*,
 I am not able to comprehend. For he had just
 before maintained, that “*properly speaking, the*
 “*Mind can ONLY have Direct and Immediate*
 “*Ideas of the Objects of Sensation.*”—But to
 proceed.—Whether the *Idea-Monger*, This
 Gentleman has his Eye upon, can with any Sha-
 dow of Reason, be charged with Thus *Shackling*
 and *Fettering the Mind*;—Whether he has *tied*
down the Mind altogether to Objects of Sensation;
 —Or whether the very Reverse be not True,
 —Let every Man that can read, determine
 for Himself.—Does not Mr. *Locke* expressly
 say, that we have *Ideas* of the Operations of
 our Minds?†—That we have *Ideas* of Things
Spiritual and *Immaterial*?‡—That we have
Ideas of the *Existence*, *Properties*, or *Attributes*

* Procedure, &c. P. 438—440.

† B. 2. c. 1. § 4.

‡ B. 2. c. 23. § 15.

of God? *—But yet, it seems, he has *tied down the Mind altogether to Objects of Sensation*; and *Thus plainly destroyed even Natural Religion*.—It is indeed Generously acknowledged, that he does not *Expressly*, or in *Profession*, renounce all *Natural Religion at least*; but only *plainly destroys it by Immediate Necessary Consequence*.—If we enquire what are the Principles, from whence These Consequences so *immediately and necessarily* flow? It is That *Fundamental Principle*,—"If
 " *our Words do not stand for Ideas, They are*
 " *Sounds and Nothing else.* And that the Mind
 " [or rather *Reason*, as my Edition reads it] *nei-*
 " *ther doth nor can extend itself farther than They*
 " *do, &c.*" †

How strongly, *Crites*, do These Principles infer the Conclusion? Could any One have suspected, that the declaring *Words to be mere empty Sounds without Ideas*; that is, without some real *Meaning, Notion, or Conception* of the Mind belonging to them:—Or the affirming that *Reason cannot extend itself farther than our Ideas or Conceptions do*:—Could any One have imagined, that such Propositions should either *tie down the Mind altogether to Objects of Sensation*; or by *Immediate Necessary Consequence, plainly destroy even Natural Religion*? Nay both *Natural and Revealed Religion* too; as This Gentleman elsewhere maintains? || There is indeed no doubt to be made, but whatever tends to destroy the Former, must directly tend to destroy the Latter. But as they are both founded in the highest Reason; Is it not something improbable,

* B. 4. c. 3. § 18. c. 10. † B. 4. c. 17. 9.

|| Procedure, &c. P. 86 — 420.

Crites, that Reason should be destructive, or injurious to either? — But however, “ Under the Colour of adhering to the strictest Sense, and Reason and Evidence, Men who lay down these Positions, lay an injurious and unnatural Restraint upon the Understanding, and tie it down to the Objects or Ideas of Sensation only, &c.”

If the learned Author means, that *under the Colour of adhering to the strictest Sense and Reason and Evidence*, Mr. Locke has not adhered strictly to them; but only under the Pretext of so doing, *has laid an injurious and unnatural Restraint upon the Understanding*; — It may be readily submitted, whether this Gentleman has in any Measure made good his Charge? — But if he really means, that the *adhering to the strictest Sense, and Reason and Evidence*, actually *lays an injurious and unnatural Restraint upon the Understanding*; I shall then leave it with all the Enemies of *Sense and Reason and Evidence*, to make the most of it.

C. Well *Philander*, but if Nothing be an *Idea*, as our Author maintains, but what is the Object of one of our five Senses; * then it is evident, that if our Mind can extend no further than our Ideas; It is certainly *tied down altogether to Objects of Sensation*: and consequently Religion itself is in Danger.

P. Excellently well reasoned, indeed, *Crites*! But surely this Gentleman does not draw Consequences from Mr. Locke's Words, without attending to what Mr. Locke means by them?

* Procedure &c. p. 59. See also p. 64—72.

— If He does ; how is Mr. *Locke* concerned in Those Consequences ? — If he does not ; How has Mr. *Locke* tied down the Mind altogether to Objects of Sensation ; Or by immediate necessary Consequence destroyed Natural Religion ?

That we certainly live, *Crites*, in a *Sceptical and unbelieving Age*, is a very notorious and a very melancholy Truth. But if we think to reform it by these Methods ; if we hope to cure the World of Scepticism and Infidelity by such Representations of Men and Things ; I am greatly apprehensive, that our own fatal Experience will convince us, we are mistaken.

So far was Mr. *Locke* from *Expressly or in Profession renouncing all natural Religion* ; that he has *Expressly* given the highest Proof of the sincerest Respect for Divine Revelation. And of which, it is impossible for any unprejudiced Mind, to entertain the least Doubt. — For besides what we have already mentioned from his Essay ; — Besides the excellent Things we might mention from some of his other Pieces ; * — When he had been often importuned by the ingenious Mr. *Molyneux* to write a System of Morality, — he thus answers, — “ Did the
“ World want a Rule, I confess there could be
“ no Work so necessary, nor so commendable.
“ But the Gospel contains so perfect a Body of
“ Ethics, that Reason may be excused from
“ that Enquiry, since she may find Man’s Du-
“ ty clearer and easier in Revelation than in
“ herself.” †

* See his Reasonableness of Christianity, and his Preface to the Commentary on some of St. *Paul’s* Epistles.

† Collection of Letters p. 144.

And in a Letter to the learned *Limborch*, he takes Notice, that “ Father *Simon* in his critical History, frequently used This Argument, “ against the constant Inspiration of the Apostles, — That there are many Things said “ by them, which might be said without the “ Assistance of the Holy Ghost. Upon which “ Mr. *Locke* very justly observes, that even “ This being granted, it concludes Nothing against the Divine Authority and Inspiration “ of the Holy Scripture — And as to the “ Explication of that Promise, [*John* xvi. 13.] “ in which Father *Simon* is very copious, “ [p. 256.] It cannot in my Opinion, says “ Mr. *Locke*, by any Means be accommodated “ to the Apostle *Paul*. For how should he, “ who was an Enemy, and as he confesses himself, ignorant of the Gospel, so soon become “ an Interpreter and Preacher of its Mysteries, “ without a Supernatural and Divine Inspiration? ” *

Surely, *Crites*, if ever the real Sentiments of Men’s Hearts can be discovered, it must be in their private Correspondence, with their particular and intimate Friends. And therefore let Mankind judge, with what Candour and Justice that Gentleman is used.

* Ibid. p. 303, 304.



A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. *LOCKE*, &c.

DIALOGUE II.

CRITES and PHILANDER.

Crit.



Shall now, *Philander*, consider Mr. *Locke's* *Ideas of Reflection*; which though they may appear a light and trivial Subject; yet our learned Author observes, They are not only “injurious to Knowledge in general; “but to that of Religion in particular, and “lead Men directly into *Scepticism* and *Infidelity*.”*

* Procedure p. 419, 420. See also p. 63, 64—72.

Phi. Sc

Pbi. So that if *Mr. Locke, Crites*, has not destroyed Religion, by the *Objects of Sensation*; He will however destroy it, (for destroyed it must be) by the *Objects, or Ideas of Reflection*.

Never surely had any poor Gentleman harder Fate! For whether he *ties or unties* the Mind, it is all one.—Knowledge and Religion fall before him, in what Shape or Form soever he approaches.

C. Well but, *Philander*, This Mischief is done, by these Ideas “tending to fix Men in this Opinion; that they can have no Knowledge of Things, whereof they had no direct Ideas.”†

P. One fatal Error, *Crites*, is certainly apt to produce another. Thus from *Mr. Locke's* affirming, that we have *Ideas of the Operations* of our Minds; Men are taught to believe his other *immoral* Maxim, that *we can have Knowledge, no farther than we have Ideas.**—And thus *Ignorance and Irreligion, Scepticism and Infidelity* are propagated in the World!

C. You may smile, *Philander*; but you will certainly find, that the learned Author has entirely overthrown both these Maxims. But as the former seems to be the Foundation of the other; He has been very large in detecting the Falsity of it: and therefore with That, I propose to begin.

You know, *Philander*, *Mr. Locke* maintains; that both external Objects, and the Operations of our Minds, are the Fountains of Knowledge; and that from the one, as well as the

† p. 420.

* H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 3. § 1.

other of these, all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring. Moreover he calls the *Ideas* received from outward Objects, *Ideas of Sensation*; and those, which he says are furnished from the Mind's reflecting on its own Operations, he calls *Ideas of Reflection*.* And withall He uses the Word *Idea*, for whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, or *Species*, or whatever the Mind can be employed about in Thinking.† Not only for what may be revived in our Minds by the Memory;‡ but also for the *Immediate Perception* or *Consciousness* of what the Mind is doing or suffering.† In short for whatever the Mind *perceives* in itself, or is the immediate Object of *Perception*, *Thought*, or *Understanding*.**

P. I think it is very evident, *Crites*, that Mr. *Locke* uses the Word *Idea*, in this very extensive Sense: He knew of no other Term, that could so well answer all these Purposes; *† nor am I able to see what can in Reason be objected to it.

C. In my Opinion, *Philander*, the other is much more in the Right; who will allow of no *Ideas*, but the Perceptions of the five Senses.*‡ Who maintains that “nothing is more true in Fact, than that we have no *Ideas*, but of “sensible Objects.”†* And that “we cannot “have the least direct or reflex *Idea* of the Operations of our Minds.”†† And withall observes, that “when the *Ideas* of *Sensation* and

* B. 2. c. 1. § 1—5. † II. Understanding, B. 1. c. 1. § 8.

‡ B. 4. c. 2. § 14. † B. 1. c. 1. § 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 2. 4. 9. ** B. 2. c. 8. § 8. *† B. 1. c. 1. § 8.

‡ Procedure, p. 59. † p. 64—72. †† p. 67.

Reflection,

“ *Reflection*, are first laid down indifferently for
 “ the Ground-Work, then Men run endless Di-
 “ visions upon them ; then come on Com-
 “ pound Ideas of both together ; Ideas of sim-
 “ ple Modes ; Ideas of mixed Modes ; Ideas of
 “ primary and secondary Qualities ; Ideas of
 “ Relation ; Ideas of Passions ; Ideas of Power ;
 “ Ideas of Causes and Effects ; Ideas of Virtues
 “ and Vices ; and in short every Thing must be
 “ ranged under some Head or other of Ideas ;
 “ — And thus they go on till their Heads
 “ are so filled and impregnated with them, that
 “ they turn every Thing into Ideas, that comes
 “ in their Way, insomuch that they can neither
 “ *think*, nor *speak* without them.”* — It is
 “ not strange, that young Students should be
 “ amused and dazzled with such *Paint* and
 “ *Glittering Outside* of Knowledge ; but it may
 “ be justly wondred at, that Men of Progress
 “ in Years and Learning should be so pleased
 “ and delighted with this *empty Noise* and *Ging-*
 “ *ling* of Ideas ; that they cannot be too lavish
 “ in their Admiration and Praises, and Recom-
 “ mendation of such Systems, as draw them out
 “ into great Lengths, without any real and so-
 “ lid Improvement of Human Understanding
 “ at the Bottom.”†

P. That *Men of Progress in Years and Learning* should be pleased and delighted with an *empty Noise and Gingling of Ideas* ; I do agree with this learned Writer, *may be justly wondred at*. But that it should be charged upon any one, as a Fault, that *They can neither think or speak with-*

* Procedure, p. 68, 69.

† p. 71.

out *Ideas*, I must beg leave to differ from that Gentleman in; Since it is the Want of *Clear* and *Distinct* *Ideas*, which seems to be the principal Unhappiness of many *Thinkers*, *Writers*, and *Speakers*: Though I suppose, *Crites*, this is only to railly that long Catalogue of *Ideas*, which was just given us. But are we to look upon this Piece of Raillery, as a Confutation of them?

C. No, *Philander*, we have something else to offer.——But first give me leave to mention what follows;——“Take a Sample, says he, “of this profound *Ideal* Wisdom out of one “of the most celebrated Authors of this Strain; “——Would you know what Power is? The “Answer is,——That *it is a Compound Idea of “the Mind, which it hath received both from Sen- “sation and Reflection*; that is to say in plain “Language, it is something we know by our “Senses and our Reason.——But how comes “any Thing like it into the Mind at all? Thus; “The Mind being every Day informed by the “Senses of the Alteration of those simple *Ideas*, “it observes in Things without; and taking “Notice how one comes to an End, and ceases “to be, and another begins to exist, which was “not before; reflecting also on what passes “within itself, and observing a constant Change “of its *Ideas*, sometimes by the Impression of “outward Objects on the Senses, and sometimes “by the *Determination of its own Choice*; and “concluding from what it has so constantly ob- “served to have been, that the like Changes “will for the future be made in the same “Things, by like Agents, and by the like
“ Ways,

“ Ways, considers in one Thing the Possibility
 “ of having any of its simple *Ideas* changed,
 “ and in another the Possibility of making that
 “ Change; and so comes by that *Idea*, which
 “ we call Power.”——“ What a Treasure of
 “ Wisdom, says our Author, is here unlocked
 “ and laid open to the View of ignorant Novices!
 “ After reading that long Description, let any
 “ Man look into his own Mind and observe,
 “ whether he doth not know as little of the true
 “ Nature of Power, as he did before.”*

P. It not appearing, *Crites*, to have been the Design of Mr. *Locke* in those Places, which are here animadverted on, either to lay open a *Treasure of Wisdom to ignorant Novices*; or to give a Description of the true Nature of Power to any one else; but only to offer his Opinion, how we come first by the *Idea* of it:† And which he calls a *Simple* (not a *Compound*) *Idea*, received from *Sensation* and *Reflection*;||——I therefore submit, *Crites*, whether all the Satyr, which is here so plentifully played off, might not full as well have been spared.

C. But it is likewise to be observed, that “ This Account all along grossly supposes *Ideas* “ to be in the Things *without* us, which are only in ourselves, and not in the Objects.”‡

P. Mr. *Locke* having no less than twice advertised his Readers, that in Case “ he should “ sometimes speak of *Ideas*, as in the Things themselves, he would be understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects, which produce them in

* p. 69, 70. † H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 21. § 1, 7.
 || B. 2. c. 7. § 1—8. ‡ Procedure, p. 70.

us;* I say after this repeated Notice, to charge him with any thing so *grossly absurd*, must appear at least a *Sample* of great *Forgetfulness* in that Gentleman.—

C. He moreover takes Notice, that “there is
“no more in that Description, than this in plain
“Language; because we observe the Things
“without us change, and we find *the Mind*
“*changes*; therefore we infer, there must be some-
“thing, able to make and to suffer that Change.
“Whereas really nothing can carry the Mind far-
“ther from a true Notion of Power; and particu-
“larly from the Infinite Power of God, with
“whom *there is no Variableness, or Shadow of*
“*Change.*”†

P. The active Power of the Mind to change, alter or vary its *Ideas* by the *Determination* of its own *Choice*; || and to *move several Parts* of our *Body* at *Pleasure*; ‡ is rendered in plain Language — the Mind *changes*. — If such Language would *carry the Mind from a true Notion of Power*, either in God or Man, where is the Wonder, *Crites*? But to whom the Honour of it belongs, I leave entirely to your own Reflections.

C. “If it be replied, says our learned Author, that we form an *Idea* even of the Power of God, as is above described; § then I ask, what becomes of the greatest Instance of his Power, that of *Creation*, which is no *Change*, but a Production out of nothing? Upon that refined and abstracted Notion of Power, we

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 8. § 8. c. 31. § 2.

† Procedure, p. 70. || H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 31. § 1. ‡ B. 2. c. 7. § 8.

“ must ridiculously suppose, that there was a
 “ *passive* Power in the Creature to be made be-
 “ fore it had a Being; and an *active* Power in
 “ the Creator to make it: and in short that
 “ God hath no Power at all of *Creation*, and
 “ can only change all which *before* had a Being,
 “ and a *passive* Power in them to be changed.”*

P. I will presume to think, *Crites*, that this *Notion* is a very harmless and rational *Notion*; Since it is so far from being injurious to the *Power* of *Creation*, that it is able to remind us of it, and direct us to it. — For will not the contemplating the *active* Powers of our own Minds, naturally lead us to that Source of all *Power*, from whence they are derived? And when once we are led to this *Almighty Power* of God; can we, without gross Negligence, miss of his *Creating Power*?

It is true, indeed, Mr. *Locke* there mentions *Changes* and *Alterations* made and undergone; but I believe for Reasons, which must be obvious to most Readers: Because he is only considering, how the Mind comes at first, by the *Idea* of Power, whether active or passive. But must not the Mind first take its *Notion* of Power, from something which has actually fallen under its own Notice? Or does a *Production out of nothing* offer itself *first* to the Mind?

Had Mr. *Locke* indeed maintained, that we could form *no Idea* of any active Power whatever, but what must exert itself upon that, which *before* had a Being; there would have been sufficient Reason for these Objections. —

* Procedure, p. 72.

But the learned Author could not but know, that Mr. *Locke* was too great a Friend to Creating Power, * to talk in such a manner. — And what that whole String of *Suppositions* can have to support it, I really see not.

C. As to Pain and Pleasure, they are according to Mr. *Locke*, two other *Ideas*, both of *Sensation* and *Reflection*. † But our Author maintains, “ that we have not, properly speaking, any *Idea* of Pain, as our most celebrated Idealists assert we have; for if we had, we should not discern the Pain itself, either of Body or Mind; but the *Idea* of it.” ‖ —

P. I think, *Crites*, you know something of Pain. —

C. If severe Fits of the Gout, *Philander*, can acquaint me with it, I am no Stranger to it.

P. Can you form any Notion, *Crites*, what Torture your last Fit gave you?

C. A very clear one, *Philander*.

P. Then I find you can discern Pain at one Time, and form a *Notion* (though not an *Idea*) of it at another. — Is not this, *Crites*, an excellent Way to confute the Idealists?

C. But that Gentleman rightly observes, “ it is enough and too much, that we have an immediate internal *Sensation*, or *Feeling* of bodily Pain; and a *Consciousness* of Anguish or Pain in the Mind. And that the same may be said of Pleasure both of Body and Mind; for if we had the *Idea only* of *Pleasure* within us, we could not have the Substance or Rea-

* H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 10. § 18, 19.

† B. 2. c. 7. § 1. 2. ‖ Procedure. p. 71

“ lity of it : Because both could not be within
 “ us at the same time ; and thus our Happiness
 “ would not be true and real, but false and de-
 “ lusive.”*

P. To *feel* Pain, without having an *Idea* of Pain, is to *taste* Wormwood, without having an *Idea* of *Bitter*.——You just observed, *Crites*, that by *Idea*, Mr. *Locke* means not only what may be *revived in our Minds* by the Memory ; but also what we have an immediate Perception or Consciousness of.——In this last Sense, to *feel* Pain, is to have an *Idea* of it. In the former Sense, without having *felt* Pain ; we could have no more *Idea* of it, than a Man born blind has of Colours. And I think, *Crites*, the same will hold equally true as to *Pleasure* or *Happiness*.——I do agree indeed with this learned Writer, that if we had the *Idea only* of these, we could not have the *Substance* or *Reality* of them. But why a Man should not be able to form an *Idea* what *Happiness* is, whilst under the very Enjoyment of it ; and thus have both the *Idea* and *Substance* together, remains yet to be shown.——But now, *Crites*, as Mr. *Locke's* *Ideas of Reflection*, appear to be the greatest Criminals ; be so good as to give the Reasons, why we cannot have the least direct or reflex *Idea* of the Operations of our Minds.

C. In the first Place, *Philander*, I would observe, that our Author desires “ any Man to
 “ look into himself, and try whether he can
 “ find there any *Idea* of *Thinking* or *Willing*, en-
 “ tirely separate and abstracted from any Thing

* Procedure, p. 71.

“to be thought of, or willed; or such as he
 “doth of a *Tree* or an *Horse*, and he will soon
 “be convinced of the Mistake of expressing all
 “these Operations by the Word *Idea*.”——
 “Not but he owns that the Intellect forms to
 “itself the best *Conceptions* it can of those Ope-
 “rations; not *abstractedly*, but in *Conjunction*
 “with those Objects [of Sensation] or rather
 “*Ideas* of them, which its Operations were ex-
 “ercised upon.”* But that we cannot frame
 “to ourselves the least *Idea* or Resemblance of
 “them, abstractedly from those Objects upon
 “which they operate.”†—— And elsewhere,
 “that the Mind doth not come to the Know-
 “ledge of its own Faculties, by any such unna-
 “tural *Squint*, or distorted *Turn* upon itself;
 “but by an immediate *Consciousness* of the seve-
 “ral different Ways, of its own working upon
 “those *Ideas* of Sensation lodged in the Imagi-
 “nation.”‡

P. Since this learned Writer allows, that the *Intellect forms the best Conceptions it can* of the Operations of the Mind; and since by *Ideas* of these Operations, Mr. *Locke* means no more than if he had said *Conceptions* of them;—— For this reason, the chief Points here in Question, seem to be only these;—— First, whether our *Conceptions* of these Operations can be *entirely abstracted*? Secondly, whether Nothing should be called an *Idea*, but what is either *entirely abstracted*; or like the *Idea* of a *Tree* or an *Horse*? And lastly, whether the Mind *squints* more *unnaturally*, or is more *distorted*, when it

* Procedure, p. 66, 67.

† p. 64.

‡ p. 97.

forms

forms *Ideas* of its Operations, than when it forms *Conceptions* of them?—How greatly, *Crites*, must the Resolution of these Points, contribute to the Advancement of *Knowledge* and *Religion*!

C. But pray remember, *Philander*, that this Gentleman gives the following Reasons, why they ought not to be esteemed *Ideas*; for after he has observed, that “we are conscious to
“ourselves of the two chief Operations of the
“Mind, *Thinking* and *Willing*, as also of the several Modes of them, — and affirmed that
“these are not *Ideas*; but the Actions and
“Workings of the Intellect upon *Ideas*,” He proceeds to take Notice, that “the considering
“the various Operations of the Mind, as a new
“Set of *Ideas*, is making those Operations to be
“their own *Ideas*, and exercised upon themselves: But that we do not conceive the Operations of our Minds, by the Help and Mediation of any *Ideas*, which are substituted in
“their Stead.”*

P. *Thinking* and *Willing*, *Crites*, with all their various Modes, are most certainly Operations of the Mind; — But the Mind is able to gain *Ideas* of these, by perceiving of, and reflecting on them. Without this, we could have no more *Ideas* of what passed within us, than a Man would have of any Object he might gaze upon, whilst his Thoughts and Attention were absent. Nor would these Operations thus become *their own Ideas*, but the *Ideas* of the Mind. — As to their being exercised upon themselves, and conceived by the Help of *Ideas*, substituted in

* Procedure, p. 64—66.

their Stead; — If by this, the learned Author only means, that according to Mr. *Locke*, the Mind can employ its Thoughts to day, upon the Thoughts of yesterday; — Or that when any particular Operation is over, as *Doubting* for Instance, the Mind can reflect upon it, and consider it at Pleasure without exerting again the same Mode of Thinking; — I take all this to be very true; but know not what can possibly be objected to it. — And if that Gentleman means any Thing else; — I may however venture to engage, that his Objections will hold equally strong, even though we should change *Ideas* into *Conceptions*.

C. However this learned Writer acquaints us, what is aptly and properly called an *Idea*; and that is, “the *Representation* and *Likeness* of the
 “ Object, which is transmitted from the Senses
 “ to the Imagination, and lodged there for the
 “ View and Observation of the pure Intellect.
 “ — If any one, not yet satisfied, shall ask
 “ farther, what an *Idea* is? I shall desire him to
 “ look upon a Tree, and then immediately to
 “ shut his Eyes and try whether he retains any
 “ *Similitude* or *Resemblance* of what he saw; and
 “ if he finds any such within him, let him call
 “ that an *Idea*, till a better Word can be found;
 “ and thus he will have a more exact Know-
 “ ledge of what an *Idea* is, than he could attain
 “ to, by any *Description* or *Definition* of it.”*
 — And a few Pages after he observes, that
 “ Nothing is properly an *Idea*, but what stands
 “ in the Mind, for an *Image* or *Representation*

* P. 58, 59.

“ of something, which is not in it ; the Thing
 “ must be without us : and because it cannot it-
 “ self enter, the Likeness of it only is conveyed
 “ through the Senses into the Imagination,
 “ which is by Nature disposed for receiving and
 “ retaining the Impression. But that it is not
 “ so with the Operations of the Mind, which
 “ are themselves within us originally ; and are
 “ not known merely by any *Similitude* or *Re-*
 “ *presentation* of them in the Imagination. —
 “ This is instead of many Arguments to shew
 “ the great Mistake and Absurdity of that Ex-
 “ pression, *Ideas of Reflection.*” *

P. This Gentleman, *Critus*, is so accustomed
 to take his *Instances* and *Similitudes* from the Sight,
 as he observes himself ; † and to explain the
 Nature of an *Idea*, from the Impression of the
Seal upon *Wax* ; ‖ from a *Landscape* conveyed
 into a dark Chamber by an Artificial Eye in
 the Wall ; ‡ from an *House* and *Human Body* ; **
 from the *Resemblance* of a *Tree* in one Place ; *†
 and from a *Tree* and a *Horse* together in ano-
 ther ; *‖ that I do not wonder, it is affirmed,
 that an *Idea* must be always the *Image*, *Likeness*,
 or *Representation* of something which is not in the
Mind. But I should be glad to know, what
 that is, without the Mind, which the *Smell* of a
Rose, or the *Taste* of *Wormwood*, is the *Simili-*
tude or *Representation* of ? Can those *Ideas* or
Perceptions we have of the *Scent* of the one, or
 the *Taste* of the other, be called the *Likeness*, the
Image, or *Representation* of either ? — They

* p. 65, 66.

† p. 59, 60.

‖ p. 52.

‡ p. 59.

** p. 100.

*† p. 58, 59.

*‖ p. 64.

are indeed occasioned by Objects from *without* ; but there is no *more Resemblance* between these *Ideas*, and such *Objects*, than there is between the *Scent* of a Rose, and the *Sound* of a Trumpet. — But if by *Similitude*, *Image*, or *Representation*, this Gentleman only means, there is a certain *Conformity*, between our *Sensations* and the *Things* themselves which occasion them ; or that these *Ideas* answer and agree to those *Powers* of *Things*, which produce them in our *Minds* ; as Mr. *Locke* very accurately and cautiously expresses himself, * — and as this learned Author elsewhere speaks : † — I say if this be all that is meant by these *Images*, *Similitudes*, and *Representations*, no Objection can certainly be made to the Sense of the Words ; though it may be submitted, whether this Gentleman could have thought of any Description, which would more naturally draw off the Mind from his true Meaning or Intention. — For though he says, that *under his Instances and Similitudes taken from Sight, he comprehends all other Sensations*, ‡ I beg leave to be of Opinion, that *Thinking* or *Willing* might as well be comprehended under all such *Similitudes*, as either *Scent* or *Taste* or *Sound*.

However, was his Account of an *Idea* never so clear, and well adapted to all the Perceptions of the *five Senses* ; yet it may be asked, by what Authority this Gentleman confines that Word to those Perceptions only ? To say an *Idea* must be the *Similitude* of something without the *Mind* ; and then infer the *Absurdity* of *Ideas* of

* H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 4. § 4. B. 2. c. 30. § 2.

† Procedure, p. 61, 62. ‡ p. 60.

Reflection, seems to be an Argument not the most convincing or satisfactory.

C. But is it not certain, that “ whenever the
“ Word is applied to the *Operations* of our
“ Minds; or to these considered in Conjunction
“ with any of those *Ideas* of *Sensation* on which
“ they operate, it is used in a very loose and im-
“ proper Manner? And the calling them all
“ *Ideas* indifferently, and in the same Propriety
“ and Strictness of Speech without Distinction,
“ hath it not evidently tended to the amusing
“ and perplexing the Understanding?” *

P. I suppose, *Crites*, it will be allowed, that the Word *Idea* in its primary Acceptation, signifies the *external Form*† or *Appearance* of Things. If so, it can in this strict Sense, I think, relate only to the *Perceptions* of Sight. — And most certain it is, that the Word when applied to an *Horse*, and when applied to *Sound*, stands for something as different, as when applied to an *Horse*, and when applied to *Thinking*. By the *Idea* of the former, we strictly mean an *Image*, *Likeness*, or *Representation* of him in the Mind; but he that can draw the Picture of *Sound* in his own Imagination, may easily paint *Thought* or any of its Modes. — So that in some of the *Perceptions* of our Senses, the Word seems as far removed from its first and strictest Acceptation, as in any of the *Operations* of the Mind whatever. And I am persuaded, *Crites*, you will find upon Reflection, that your *Understanding* is as little *amused* and *perplex-*

* p. 63, 64.

† *ἰδέα, μορφή, εἶδος. Hesychius.*

ed with the *Idea* of *Thinking*, as with the *Idea* of any *Scent*, or *Sound*, or *Taste* whatever.

C. I must own, I should think, with the learned Author, that “when once we pass the “*Ideas* of *Sensation*, the Word is ever after *equivocal*, and of an *uncertain* Meaning; and “applied, not without great *Confusion* and *Detriment* to the Progress of our *Understanding* “in the Pursuit of *Knowledge*. And therefore with just Reason he recommends “those “Words, which obtained in the World, before “the Word *Idea* usurped upon them, and thrust “them out of Use; — such as *Notion*, or “*Conception*, or *Apprehension*, or *Consciousness*, “or some other Term of this Sort, which may “distinguish this Kind of Knowledge, from “that which we have of external Objects, by “their internal *Ideas*.” *

P. How unmercifully is this poor Word persecuted, when applied to the *Operations* of the Mind! In short, *Crites*, though I take the *Idea* of *Thinking*, or of any of its Modes, to have as *known*, and as *steady* a Meaning, as the *Idea* of *Sound*, or the *Idea* of a *Steeple*; yet if you should really find greater *Confusion* and *Detriment to the Progress of your Understanding in the Pursuit of Knowledge*, from the Use of this *Sound*, than from *Notion*, *Conception*, *Apprehension*, or *Consciousness*; I join with the learned Writer in recommending these Terms, or indeed any other, before that *usurping* and pernicious Word *Idea*.

C. However Mr. *Locke* not only maintains, that we have *Ideas* of the *Operations* of our

Mind ; but that these are as *clear* and *distinct*, as those we have of the sensible Qualities of *Corporeal* Substance.† But our learned Author thus argues against that Notion. — “ We have, “ says he, *immediate simple original* Ideas of the “ Qualities of Corporeal Substance, by Impres- “ sion from outwards Objects ; but there are *no* “ Ideas within us, of the Operations of the “ Mind ; so that the Operations *themselves* are “ discerned, and not any *Ideas* instead of them : “ And that too no otherwise than by a *Consci-* “ *ousness* of the Mind’s operating from the first “ upon *Ideas* of *Sensation*, and afterwards upon “ those *Compound* Ideas and *Complex* Notions, “ which it raises up to it self out of them.” *

P. And how, *Crites*, will the *discerning* the *Operations themselves* hinder us from having *clear* and *distinct* Ideas of them ? Why just as the *discerning* Light and Colour, will hinder us from having *clear* and *distinct* Ideas of *Light* and *Colour*. — To say that we can have *no* Ideas of the *Operations* of the Mind ; and yet that we have a *Consciousness* of them, || is to say, we can have no *Idea* of *Sound*, whilst we *hear* it ; or of *Colour* whilst we see it. Or to imagine we can have no *Idea* of those Operations, when they are over, is to imagine we can have no *Idea* of the *Smell* of a *Rose*, in the midst of *Winter*. — But what can hinder the Mind from having as *clear* and *distinct* Ideas of its own *Operations*, as of any thing that affects it from without ? — I believe, *Crites*, it will be found upon Enquiry,

† H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 15, 24, 28, 30, 32

* Procedure, p. 442, 443. † p. 64 97.

to be only that, which will equally prevent our having *clear and distinct Ideas* of many outward Objects, and that is, the Want of due *Care* and *Attention*. *

C. "But if Men, *Philander*, must have all "the *Operations* of our Minds to be *Ideas*, and "will right or wrong call them by that Name; "yet it is plain they would be neither *direct*, "nor *simple*, nor *immediate*, nor *original*. The "very Word *Reflection* would even thus speak "them to be only *Secondary*." †

P. By *Reflection*, *Crites*, Mr. *Locke* only means *That Notice, which the Mind takes of its own Operations*; || but what has this to do, with rendring the *Ideas* of them, *only secondary*? — As to their being *direct* and *immediate*, what Reason can be assigned, why the Mind cannot be as present to its own *Operations*, as to any Thing that may be conveyed to it, from *without*? Or why its *Perceptions* of those *Operations*, should not be as *direct* and *immediate*, as its *Perceptions* of *Scent* or *Sound*? Change but the Name, and our *Conceptions* of those *Operations*, may be called *direct*; ‡ and we are also allowed an *immediate Consciousness* of them. **

Well but still, They are neither *simple* or *original*. What may be the Reason? Why, we have no *Ideas* of *Thinking* or *Willing* *entirely separate or abstracted from any thing to be thought of or willed*. And the Mind must have some *Ideas* of *Sensation* to operate upon. *†

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 1. § 7, 8.

† *Procedure*, p. 66.

|| H. Understanding, B. 2.

c. 1. § 4. ‡ p. 111.

*† p. 97.

*† p. 64-67, 97, 442, 443.

There is no doubt to be made, *Crites*, but the Mind must have some Object or other to employ it, or it can neither *think* or *will* — But whatever it be, that the Mind *wills* or *thinks* of; that Object will be as distinct an *Idea*, from the *Idea* of *thinking* or *willing*, and as easily *separated* by the Mind, as the *Idea* of *Sound*, from the *Idea* of the *Instrument* it proceeds from. — And it may be submitted, whether the same Argument won't equally prove, that no *Ideas* of *Sensation* are *simple* or *original*; forasmuch as without Objects suited to each Sense, it is hard to conceive how either of the Senses can possibly be employed, or any Sensation excited. — And indeed, *Crites*, some of this learned Writer's Arguments against *Ideas* of *Reflection* are couched in such Terms, that nothing but his own Declarations, could induce a Reader to believe he allowed of *any Ideas*, but those of Sight.

C. He does not only affirm, that the Perceptions of all the Senses are *Ideas*; but gives I think a very convincing Reason, why they ought to be so esteemed. — “ For otherwise, says he, “ a blind Man, though he was born with all his “ other Senses, could have no Impression of “ any Object conveyed to his Imagination, “ which might be an *Idea* or Representation of “ it; and consequently he could have no Knowledge, no not so much as any irrational Animal.”*

P. Good *Crites*, would not the very same Impressions of any Object be conveyed to this blind

* p. 59.

Man's Imagination, whether his *Perceptions* were allowed to be *Ideas* or not? Will the giving any particular *Name* to his *Perceptions* render the Man more or less capable of conceiving what any Object is? Or will not his *Notions* of *hard* and *soft*, *sweet* and *bitter*, *Scents* and *Sounds*, be as much the *Representations* of outward Objects; as if such *Notions* were to be called *Ideas*? — And therefore since this Man is allowed to have *Notions*, *Conceptions*, *Apprehensions*, and a *Consciousness* of these Things; if this will not secure him from having less *Knowledge* than any *irrational Animal*, how can the calling of them *Ideas*, possibly secure him? And therefore whether the learned Author's Arguments *in behalf* of these *Ideas* of *Sensation*, be more conclusive than what he has offered *against* *Ideas* of *Reflection*, I leave, *Crites*, to your own Thoughts to determine.






A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE, &c.

DIALOGUE III.

CRITES *and* PHILANDER.

Crit.  PERHAPS, *Philander*, Mr. *Locke's Ideas of Reflection* are not so safe as you may imagine. I shall give you an Argument against them, digested into an Hypothetical Syllogism, and another against his Favourite Maxim, that *our Knowledge reaches no farther than we have Ideas*; which I am persuaded will prove altogether decisive.—But I must first beg your Patience, whilst I observe what has been objected to some other *Ideas* of Mr. *Locke*.

He affirms that our *Ideas* of any particular Substance are *complex*; but yet neither *clear*, or
distinct,

distinct, or *adequate*.* But our Author maintains that “ the *Idea* caused in the Mind, by our
 “ looking on a *Man*, or an *Horse*, or a *Tree*, is a
 “ *simple Idea* ; and is *distinct* and *clear* and *adequate* ;
 “ and the Reason is plain, because such an *Idea*
 “ contains all the Object is naturally disposed to
 “ imprint upon the Sense *at once*, and all that the
 “ Sense is framed and contrived by the Author
 “ of Nature to take in or receive at one Act
 “ of Sensation. Of this Kind are all our *Ideas* of
 “ every single and particular Substance ; for
 “ though when I look upon it, I do not see in-
 “ to the inward *Essence*, and Configuration of
 “ all its Parts, nor discern all its primary and
 “ secondary Qualities, nor how they subsist in
 “ it, nor can view it so as to take in all its
 “ Powers active and passive : Yet the *Idea* com-
 “ prehends all that the Object is naturally dis-
 “ posed to imprint upon the Sense at once, and
 “ all that either the Sense or the *Imagination* is
 “ capable of receiving from one single View.
 “ Whatsoever is beyond this, is the Object of
 “ more *particular* Sensations, or rather of Rea-
 “ son and Observation, and not of one single
 “ Act of Sensation. And sure it must be absurd
 “ to say, that an *Idea* of Sensation, is either *ob-*
 “ *scure*, and *indistinct*, or *inadequate*, because it doth
 “ not contain what the Object cannot communi-
 “ cate to the Sense, nor the Sense is any way ca-
 “ pable of perceiving. From hence we see how
 “ *fanciful* and *precarious* that opinion is, which
 “ asserts our *Ideas* of even single Substances to

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 12. § 6. c. 23. § 4—14.
 c. 31. § 8—13.

“be *complex* and *indistinct* and *obscure* or *inadequate*; because we do not discern the inward Configuration of all their Parts, together with all their essential Qualities and Powers by any Act of Sensation. Whereas for the same Reason, there could be no such thing as a clear and distinct *Idea* of any Object whatsoever. Thus you shall have no clear and distinct *Idea* of *Sound*, because in one and the same Sensation, we do not perceive that Commotion or Concussion of the Air which causes it, and those Undulations which gradually flowing from thence do at length strike upon the Organ of Hearing.”——To the same purpose he observes in relation to the Perceptions of the other Senses, and withal says, that this *absurd* Opinion was invented and *tediously* pursued, only for the Support of that *bold* and *irrational* Position, that *we have as clear and distinct an Idea of the Substance of a Spirit, as we have of bodily Substance.**

P. This *bold* and *irrational*, or as the learned Author chuses elsewhere to stile it, this *monstrous* Position, †, we may possibly have an Opportunity of considering hereafter. || Our present Business, *Crites*, is to enquire what Mr. *Locke* can offer in support of that *fanciful*, *precarious*, and *absurd* Opinion, which asserts our *Ideas* of Substances to be *complex*, *indistinct*, *obscure*, and *inadequate*.——And first they are called *complex*, for this one plain Reason, because they are made

* Procedure, p. 120—122. See H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23 § 5. † Procedure, p. 74. || See the fourth Dialogue.

up of various *simple Ideas*.* — Moreover, *Crites*, if we know not what Substance is, as Mr. *Locke* maintains;† or if we are Strangers to its *inward Essence*, and to many of its *Powers*, *active* and *passive*, as this Gentleman himself seems to allow; how can our *Ideas* or *Conceptions* of it, be *clear*, or *distinct*, or *perfect*? — If our *Ideas* of Substance be referred to *Real Essences*; of these, says Mr. *Locke*, we are ignorant.‡ — If to those *Qualities* and *Powers* of Substances, whereof we make their complex *Ideas*; These are so many and various, that no Man's complex *Idea* contains them all: And therefore he ventures to call them, *imperfect* and *inadequate*.§ — The contrary to all this, the learned Author affirms is plain, because our *Idea* [of a Tree, for Instance] contains all that the Object can imprint upon the Sense at once, and all that the Sense is framed to receive at one Act of Sensation. — As if our *Ideas* of Substances must therefore be *clear* and *distinct* and *perfect*; because they are as clear, and distinct, and perfect, as the Nature of Things, and our present Circumstances will admit of. — Besides it is objected, that if Matters are, as Mr. *Locke* represents them, that then our *Idea* of Sound will not be *clear* and *distinct*, because in one and the same Sensation, we do not perceive the Concussion of Air, &c.

In one and the same Sensation, *Crites*, we may certainly gain a *clear* and *distinct* and *adequate*

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 12. § 3—6.

† B. 2. c. 23. § 3—15. c. 31. § 13. || B. 2. c. 31. § 6—7. ‡ H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 31. § 8—11.

Idea of Sound ; even though in many Sensations, we should know nothing of the *Concussion* of Air, or the *Undulations* that strike upon the Organ of Hearing. For our *Idea* of Sound, having nothing to do with the Knowledge of such *Undulations*, and *Concussions*, will be very *clear* and *distinct*, as well as *simple* and *adequate* without it.—But surely it will not follow from hence, that our *Idea* of Substance must therefore have all these Properties ; which stands confest to be, at least, a Combination of various simple *Ideas*, and many of whose Properties we are altogether ignorant of.—How then can that *Idea*, *Crites*, be said to be *simple*, which is thus *compounded* ? Or that *clear* and *adequate*, which is thus *obscure* and *imperfect* ? And which, in short, not only after *one single Act* of Sensation, but after *ten thousand*, will still leave us in the dark, in respect of many Powers and Qualities of Substance ? *

C. But as to a *simple Idea*, *Philander*, our Author says he “ means by it, all that *Resemblance* or *Similitude* of the external Object, “ which the Organ of Sensation is capable of “ receiving in one distinct Perception ; as the “ *Idea* of an human Body.” †

P. An human Body, *Crites*, when placed in View, will certainly, if the Eyes be in right Order, furnish the Mind with some *distinct Idea*, *Image*, or *Picture* ; which is what, I suppose, the learned Author here calls a *simple Idea*. But how is this to prove that Mr. *Locke* was mista-

* H. Understanding, B 2 c. 31. § 8, 10, 13.

† Procedure, p 100.

ken in calling our *Ideas* of Substance, *complex*?
 — Since it is plain by those *Ideas*, he meant
 something more, than *single Views*, or *Percep-*
tions, *Resemblances* or *Similitudes* of any Bodies
 whatever.*

C. Mr. *Locke's* Method of forming *abstract*
Ideas, differs very much from that of our learn-
 ed Author; who says, and I think rightly,
 “ that the *true* Abstraction is making the *Idea*
 “ of one Individual stand for all of the same Kind.†
 “ As when the *Idea* of one Man, stands for all
 “ Mankind, which is then called an *universal*
 “ *Idea*.‡ But that we do not form *universal*
 “ *Ideas*, by collecting all the Powers and Qua-
 “ lities observed in the Particulars of every
 “ Kind; and then putting them together to
 “ make up one *Idea* or Notion to stand for
 “ them all, and which is supposed to be formed
 “ by *abstracting* from all the Individuals.” †

P. The Methods of these two Gentlemen
 differ most certainly: And you are at full Li-
 berty, *Crites*, to chuse which you like best.
 But I hope you will recollect, that Mr. *Locke*
 does not frame *universal Ideas*, by *collecting all*
the Powers and Qualities observed in the Particulars
of every Kind, in order to make up one *Idea*; but
 by uniting in one *general Idea* all such Proper-
 ties [of a Man for instance] in which the Indi-
 viduals are found to agree, and leaving out
 those, in which they are observed to differ.**

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 12. § 6. B. 2. c. 31. § 3.
 § 6—11. † Procedure, p. 186. ‡ p. 101. See also
 p. 123. 436, 437. † p. 123. ** H. Understanding,
 B. 3. c. 3. § 6—9.

The *Idea* thus framed is called *general* or *universal*, as belonging to all the Individuals of such a Species; — and *abstracted*, because formed by *abstracting* from all those Properties or *Ideas*, in which the Individuals differ from each other.† So that to me, this Gentleman seems evidently to mistake Mr. *Locke's* Method, of framing *general Ideas*.

C. But our Author very justly observes, that
 “ these *general abstract* Ideas shall in the modern
 “ refined Method of forming them, prove the
 “ strangest and most inconsistent *Monsters* in the
 “ World. — Thus the *general abstract* Idea of
 “ *Man*, shall not be of a black or white, short
 “ or tall, thick or slender *Man*; but shall be
 “ all these and none of them at the same time:
 “ The *general abstract* Idea of a Triangle, shall
 “ be neither of an *Equilateral*, nor *Equicrura*,
 “ nor *Scalenum*, neither *Oblique* nor *Rectangle*,
 “ but all and none of these at once. — And
 “ withal he says, that some have placed the
 “ only Difference between *Man* and *Beast* in
 “ this sort of *imaginary Abstraction*, which one
 “ would think could never enter into the Head
 “ of *Man* or *Beast*.*

P. This is quite severe indeed. *Critics* — It is confessed by an ingenious Writer, that the
 “ *Enantiosis* [or Opposition] contained in the
 “ Words *all* and *none of these at once*, is pretty
 “ strong; but yet as he observes, the Meaning
 “ of it is plainly no more than this, that the ge-

† See the Notes on Archbishop *Bishop's* Origin of Evil, p. 5
 —8. And Geometry no Friend to Inidelity, p. 74 - 76.

* Procedure, p. 187, 188. See Mr. *Locke*, B. 4. c. 7. § 9.

“ *neral Idea* of a Triangle, is a part of the *Idea*
 “ of every Species of Triangles here enumera-
 “ ted, but is not the entire *Idea* of any one of
 “ them, — is common to them all, and con-
 “ fined to none.” *

In like manner, *Crites*, the *abstract* Idea of Man, being only a Combination of those *Ideas*, in which two or more Individuals are found to agree, it becomes common or equally applicable to all those Individuals: and being thus equally common to all, it can be confined to none of them in particular. It belongs as much to a *tall* Man, as a *short*, to a *black* Man, as a *white*. But not being the entire *Idea* of either, it is not peculiar or proper to the one, more than the other. — This then, *Crites*, is that *strange and inconsistent Monster, teeming with Absurdities and Contradictions*; and which the learned Author seemed to think, *could never enter into the Head of Man or Beast*. † — I would just further take notice, that Mr. *Locke* having said, that the *general Idea* of a Triangle, is *something imperfect which cannot exist*; ‖ —

A very eminent Writer thus argues, —
 “ *Consequently the Idea thereof, is impossible or in-*
 “ *consistent.*—I desire, says he, to know whether
 “ it is not possible for any thing to exist, which
 “ does not include a Contradiction?” ‡ — I am certain this learned and ingenious Gentleman cannot want to be informed that there are *intellectual* Ideas, as well as Ideas of *Imagination*.

* Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, p. 80, 81.

† Procedure, p. 117, 118. ‖ H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 7. § 9. ‡ A Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics, p. 57. by the Author of the Minute Philosopher.

Or that numberless *Ideas* or *Conceptions* of the Intellect are neither *impossible*, or *inconsistent*, or *contradictory*, though they cannot exist, but as Objects of the Understanding only.*

C. But what say you to this, *Philander*? Our Author maintains there is no such “ Thing “ in Nature, as any *Universal* really existing, either to strike upon our Senses, or to be an “ Object of our Reason; and consequently there “ can be no such *general abstract* Idea in the “ Mind. And that if there were any such, it “ would be equally simple and original with “ that of one Individual, and would necessarily “ imply this plain Absurdity, that it would be “ actually and in itself both a *simple* and *compounded* Idea at the same time, which is downright Contradiction: *Simple*, as it represented “ the whole *Kind* at once, in one *simple Idea* abstracted from all the Individuals, and *compounded* as it included them all.” †

P. I do agree, *Crites*, that *general abstract* Ideas, considered as such, have no real Existence, but are the Creatures of our own Minds. ‖ For whatever has such an Existence, must include some Particulars in it, which were left out of the *general Idea*. ‡ But why must there be no *Idea*, *Crites*, but what *really exists*, or *strikes upon the Senses*? — What can hinder the Mind from uniting such *Ideas*, or *Combina-*

* See a Treatise of Human Knowledge, by the same Author, p. 134—140. . † Procedure, p. 187, 188.

‖ H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 11. § 9. B. 3. c. 3. § 6. B. 4. c. 7. § 9. c. 9. § 1. See also the Notes on Archbishop King's Origin of Evil, p. 7, 8.

‡ Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, p. 81.

tions of *Ideas*, as will never fall under the Notice of any Sense? Or from forming such *Conceptions* or *Ideas* as can exist no where, but in the Mind itself? — Moreover, If by a *simple Idea abstracted from all the Individuals*, this Gentleman means an *Idea*, out of which is left, *what is peculiar to each Individual*, and which retains only *what is common to them all*,* then this *simple Idea* is most evidently *complex*, or *compounded*; and thus the *Contradiction* arising from an *Idea compounded and not compounded at the same time* is unhappily lost. — And if we are to understand *the uniting in one Idea all the Powers and Qualities observed in the Particulars of every Kind*,† this would still be as far from a *simple Idea*, as the other: — So that how we are to find out these *Absurdities* and *Contradictions*, I know not. — But again, let us take a *simple Idea*, as *white*, or any other Colour, and by *abstracting* from all particular Existences, or Circumstances of Existence, let it be a general Representative of that Colour, *wheresoever to be imagined or met with*;‡ is it possible to see any *Contradiction* in all this, whether this *general abstract Idea*, be now called *simple* or *complex*? Nay supposing it might be said to be both, in different Views and Respects, — *simple*, as it is *one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the Mind*, § and *complex*, as it is an *abstracted Idea*; yet here would be no more of an *Absurdity* or *Contradiction*, than to say, that *one* and the

* H. Understanding, B. 3. c. 3. § 7—9.

† See above, p. 62. ‡ H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 11.

§ 1. † B. 2. c. 2 § 1.

same Person sustained two or three very different Characters.

C. I. proceed now, *Philander*, to the Hypothetical Syllogisms, and if they do not decide the Controversy, both as to Mr. *Locke's* Ideas of Reflection, and his Maxim, that *we can have Knowledge, no farther than we have Ideas,** it will be in vain to dispute any more about them.

—— “I shall give, says our learned Author, “two Instances of the Usefulness of Syllogism, “in detecting two fundamental Fallacies cunningly wrapped up in a long Series of smooth Periods, and which have lain concealed in florid, “witty, and involved Discourses, and in reducing two Matters in Controversy of no small Importance, to a single Point of Decision.

“The first lies concealed in this Proposition, “—— *We have Ideas of the Operations of our Minds by Reflection.*

“If the Operations themselves, and the Ideas “of those Operations, be not within us at “the same Time, then there are no such “Ideas of Reflection.

“But the Operations themselves, and the Ideas “as of them, are not within us at the same “time.

“Therefore there are no such Ideas of Reflection.” ——

The † Minor, he proves by another Syllogism, *Philander*, if you have any Objection to it.

* B. 4. c. 3. § 1, 2.

† Procedure, p. 431.

P. Good *Crites*, let the Minor alone. And though enough has been already said to it,* yet either admitted or denied, it will do no manner of Harm. If we can but get rid of the Conclusion, all will be safe enough.——Let any one, *Crites*, who yesterday *doubted* with himself, whether he should go to the *Exchange*, or not, but who after some *Deliberation*, *resolved* to go; Let this Man only reflect to Day, on what passed the Day before, in his own Mind,——And can he fail of having some *Notion* or *Conception* of *doubting*, *deliberating*, and *resolving*?——And my good Friend, what are these, but Mr. *Locke's* *Ideas* of *Reflection*?——If you please, *Crites*, pray proceed against the second Maxim.

C. “The second fundamental Fallacy, says
“our Author, lies hidden in this Maxim, *All*
“our Knowledge consists in the Perception of the
“Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas.

“Against which, I argue thus,

“If we have Knowledge of Things, whereof
“we have no Ideas, then that Maxim is
“false.

“But we have Knowledge of Things, where-
“of we have no Ideas,

“Therefore that Maxim is false.”†

P. Either, *Crites*, this Gentleman uses the Term *Idea* in Mr. *Locke's* Sense, or he does not. If he does not, the whole Argumentation

* See the second Dialogue. † Procedure. p. 432, 433.

is entirely thrown away. — For if he only means, that we have *Knowledge of Things*, which we can neither *see*, *hear*, *feel*, *taste*, or *smell*, — The *Perceptions* of our Senses being all, he allows to be *Ideas*; * I say, if this be all that is meant in the Minor Proposition, Mr. *Locke* has not the least Concern in the whole Syllogism.

But if this learned Writer uses the Word *Idea* in Mr. *Locke*'s Sense of it, — “ For “ whatever a Man *observes*, and is *conscious* to “ himself he has in his Mind, † — For “ whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can “ be employed about in Thinking, ‖ — In “ short for whatever the Mind *perceives* in itself, “ or is the immediate Object of *Perception*, “ *Thought*, or *Understanding*, ” ‡ — Then I submit to all Logicians, whether that Gentleman's Syllogism be not, as to the Meaning of it, exactly the same with what follows ; —

If we have *Knowledge of Things*, which are neither the *immediate Objects of Perception*, *Thought*, or *Understanding*, of which we have no *Notion*, or *Consciousness*, and about which the Mind cannot be *employed* in Thinking ; — Then that Maxim is false.

But we have *Knowledge of Things*, which are neither the *immediate Objects of Perception*, *Thought*, or *Understanding*, of which we have no *Notion* or *Consciousness*, and

* p. 59.
‖ § 8.

† H. Understanding, B. 1. c. 1. § 3.
‡ B. 2. c. 8. § 8.

about which the Mind cannot be *employed* in Thinking;

Therefore that Maxim is false.

What would Mr. *Locke* have said, *Crites*, to have seen his Maxim thus attacked?——I am satisfied, if the learned Author had but attended to what Mr. *Locke* meant by an *Idea*, he would not have reasoned in this Manner.——And indeed after all, this Gentleman seems to me to maintain the very same Things, with Mr. *Locke*, though in different Words.——He says, that *without denying all natural as well as revealed Religion, it cannot be denied but we have Knowledge of Things spiritual and immaterial*;*——And pray, *Crites*, where does Mr. *Locke* say that we have not? Does he not maintain, and has he not proved, that God is *spiritual and immaterial*, and that we have a certain Knowledge of his Existence?†

Well but Mr. *Locke* affirms that we have *no* Knowledge, where we have *no* Ideas. And how much does this Gentleman differ from him, when he says that *we can have no Knowledge of spiritual and immaterial Things, otherwise than by complex Notions and Conceptions?*‡ And that *to know a Thing, is to have some Representation of it in the Mind?****——Indeed it may be replied, that this learned Writer asserts, that to say we have Ideas of Things *imperceptible and incomprehensible* [i. e. spiritual and immaterial] is a flat Contradiction in Terms; And as to com-

* Procedure, p. 433.

† Procedure, p. 433.

‡ H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 10.

*** P. 55.

*plex Ideas, that Expression is not Sense.** But however does he not allow, that *compound Ideas, is good Sense, and a proper way of speaking,* and that we may have *complex Notions and Conceptions, of God himself?†* And that *the Mind raises up within itself secondary Images of the Things of another World?‡*

And now, *Crites*, what are all these *compound Ideas, complex Notions, and Conceptions, secondary Images and Representations* in the Mind, but what *Mr. Locke* comprehends under the general Term *Idea*? So that after all this Solemnity, and the introducing both *Natural and Revealed Religion* into the Dispute, This Gentleman, I think has proved little more, than that he was highly displeased with *Mr. Locke*. For as to the chief Points here in Controversy, the Difference between these Gentlemen, seems to be rather in the *Expression*, than any thing else. — And the whole appears to be little more, than a warm and solemn Debate about the Propriety of one poor Word.

But whether they here agree in every Thing, but *Sound*, or not, is of no great Moment. For if the learned Author, by *compound Ideas, complex Notions, and Conceptions, &c.* means something not comprehended under *Mr. Locke's Ideas*, and consequently what the Mind can take no Notice of, — or if by Knowledge he means, what *Mr. Locke* means not,** — Then neither *Mr. Locke's* Maxims, or either of them are any way affected by that Gentleman's

* Procedure, p. 433.

† p. 455.

‡ p. 52.

** H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 1. § 2.

Arguments. They remain just as they were, and must stand or fall, as they shall be judged agreeable, or contrary to right Reason.—— Was the Affair indeed to be decided by the Triumphs of that learned Writer,——Mr. *Locke* is evidently destroyed both Root and Branch.

“ Thus, I hope, says he, these two grand
 “ Maxims are fully overthrown, which are the
 “ main Pillars, upon which that whole *Meta-*
 “ *physical* Castle in the Air was erected, that
 “ hath been so much the vain and empty *Boast*
 “ of this sceptical and unbelieving Age: And
 “ surely till these Syllogisms are clearly answer-
 “ ed, it must be allowed, by all Men, to be
 “ the *greatest Trifle*, that ever gained a Reputa-
 “ tion in the World.” *

It was surely scarce worth while, *Crites*, to be so greatly offended at so *great a Trifle* ; and which may be so effectually *overthrown* by only the Help of a little Logic. —— But since this Gentleman is willing to rest the Fate of that *Castle*, with its two *main Pillars*, upon the Strength of his Syllogisms, I very readily join Issue with him, and dare leave the Event to your own Reflections.

* Procedure, p. 434.



A

VINDICATION

OF

Mr. *L O C K E*, &c.

DIALOGUE IV.

CRITES and PHILANDER.

Crit.



S to the Syllogisms, *Philander*, I may hereafter review them at leisure, and desire now to propose some further Objections; which, I must own, appear to me very considerable, however they may happen to be esteemed by Others.

“ I am now come, says our learned Author,
“ to what is yet a greater Refinement of this
“ Ideal Knowledge, namely, that we have the
“ clearest *Idea* of active Power from our *Idea* of
“ *Spirit*, and not from Matter, because Matter
“ hath

“ hath only a *passive* Power, that is, a Power
 “ not of acting itself, but of suffering the ac-
 “ tive Power. This Spirit, according to the
 “ Standard and Oracle of Ideas in our Age,
 “ is a *Thinking Substance*; which he labours to
 “ shew may be *Matter* for ought we know, so
 “ that according to him, we have our *Idea* of
 “ active Power from Spiritual Matter, or from
 “ a *Material Spirit*. Thus hath he confounded
 “ the Use of Words, and the received Way of
 “ thinking and speaking, since by *Spirit* is ever
 “ understood something that is not Matter.
 “ — As *shameful an Absurdity*, and *palpable*
 “ *Contradiction* as this appears at first Sight, yet
 “ it is plain to be seen in that Author, and open
 “ to every considering Reader. It is impossi-
 “ ble for us to have an *Idea* of *active* Power in
 “ any Degree, if we must have it only from an
 “ *immaterial* Substance, of which we have no
 “ *Idea* at all.—The Truth is thus; we observe
 “ such Effects, with regard to Things material
 “ and sensible, as we conclude cannot proceed
 “ from any inherent Power in themselves, and
 “ therefore we rightly infer there must be some
 “ other Beings, *not material*, which have the
 “ Power of producing such Effects.”*

P. By your leave, *Crites*, we will hear what
 the *Oracle* says himself. — “ I judge it not
 “ amiss, says Mr. *Locke*, to direct our Minds to
 “ the Consideration of God and Spirits, for the
 “ clearest *Idea* of active Power.” — And as
 he there maintains that the former is above all
passive Power, so he proposes it to be consider-

* Procedure, p. 73, 74

ed, whether created Spirits be not capable of both *active* and *passive*.*——In another Section he observes, that “two Bodies placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the *Idea* of Power in the one, to move the other, but by a borrowed Motion: Whereas the Mind every Day affords us *Ideas* of an active Power of moving of Bodies, and therefore it is worth our Consideration, whether active Power be not the proper Attribute of Spirits, and passive Power of Matter.”†——And elsewhere,——“Let us suppose any Parcel of Matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it in itself, able to produce nothing.——If there were no other Being in the World, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to itself, *being purely Matter*, or produce any Thing? Matter then by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self so much as *Motion*.”‡ And yet Mr. Locke is charged with *labouring* to shew, that the *very Spirit* or *Thinking Substance*, from whence we have our *clearest Idea* of active Power, may be *Matter for ought we know*.——What a very candid Representation is here?——Are we not referred to God, as well as created Spirits, for our *clearest Idea* of active Power? And is not he declared to be the *Source* and *Original* of all Power?‡ Has Mr. Locke any where *laboured* to shew that God is Matter? Or has he not evi-

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 21. § 2.

† B. 2. c. 23. § 28. ‡ H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 10 § 10. ‡ B. 4. c. 10 § 4.

dently demonstrated the contrary? * If we are likewise referred to created Spirits, has he any where *laboured* to shew, that their *active* Powers are any way owing to Matter? Or does he not every where distinguish between such Powers, and that *dead, inactive* Lump, called *Matter*? And therefore, *Crites*, when Mr. *Locke* sends us to these *Material Spirits*, for our *Ideas* of active Power; can we get leave of ourselves to imagine, that he sends us to the *material* Part of them? — But now after the learned Author has been severe upon Mr. *Locke*, for his *material Spirit* and *spiritual Matter*, he proceeds to observe, that *it is impossible for us to have an Idea of active Power in any Degree, if we must have it only from an immaterial Substance.*

How this comes in here, I am greatly at a loss to understand. — It was a *material*, not an *immaterial, Substance*, that this Gentleman had been just animadverting on. — But however, if we cannot have an *Idea* of active Power from an *immaterial Substance*, from whence are we to have it? — Why, “ob-
“serving certain Effects, which we conclude
“cannot proceed from any inherent Power in
“material Things; we rightly infer there must
“be some other *Beings*, not *material*, which
“have the Power of producing such Effects.”
— Is not this to say, that though we cannot have such *Ideas* from an *immaterial Substance*, yet we have them from an *immaterial Being*? — If you can find out any Difference, *Crites*, in this Distinction, you will see

* B. 4. c. 12. § 10—12.

more into the Force of this Gentleman's Arguments, than every Reader can pretend to. — The next Thing to be considered, is the *Confusion*, Mr. Locke has spread amongst our Thoughts and Language, in supposing the Word *Spirit*, does not *always* signify a Being *altogether* immaterial. — The learned Author indeed here maintains, that by *Spirit* is *ever* understood something that is *not* Matter. And yet elsewhere he observes, that the Word *Ruach*, (which is one of the Words Mr. Locke had fixt upon himself*) is used to express “the *Spirit* both of *Man* and *Beast*.† — But that, though the *Word* is the same, yet that it signifies *two* Things here, not only of a *different*, but even of a quite *contrary* Nature. — That when applied to Man, it signifies the *immaterial* Part, but not so, as referred to the latter; though by a mere Necessity it “is in common applied to both.”|| — In another place he affirms, that *Spirit* in its first Propriety, is used to signify the most volatile and exalted Parts of Matter.‡ — And in a third, that *Spirit* is taken in its more original Acceptation for our Soul, which is (says he) Matter and Spirit in essential Union.** — And yet by *Spirit* is *ever* understood something that is *not* Matter.

As to the Charge of *shameful Absurdity*, and *palpable Contradiction*, which are plain to be seen in Mr. Locke, and open to every considering Rea-

* See his first Letter to Bishop Stillingfleet.

† Eccles. iii. 21. || Procedure, p. 357, 360, 361.

‡ p. 118

** p. 204.

der; — To the Thoughts of every considering Reader, I shall leave it.

C. As to Mr. *Locke's* Supposition, that a Faculty of Thinking may by God Almighty be superadded to a System of Matter; — Our Author affirms, and not without Reason, that what led Mr. *Locke* into this profound Error, “ was his not rightly distinguishing between our
 “ being capable of *abstractedly* considering the
 “ Properties of a Substance, without considering
 “ or regarding at the same time the Substance
 “ itself, in which they are, which is very possible: And the having an *actual Perception* or
 “ Idea of any *essential* Properties, separately
 “ and *abstractedly* from the Substance itself,
 “ which is impossible; because they cannot in
 “ their Nature exist separately from it. We
 “ cannot discern or form an actual Idea of the
 “ essential Properties *without* the Substance;
 “ but according to common Sense, we are said
 “ to discern those Properties *in* the Substance,
 “ or a Substance *with* such Properties: This is
 “ so evident, that a plain Man would laugh
 “ at you, if you should tell him, that he did
 “ neither taste nor feel the Substance of the
 “ Morfel of *Bread* he was eating, and that for
 “ ought he knew, he was chewing only a Parcel of Properties or *Qualities*. This absurd
 “ Notion of an *Abstraction* utterly impossible (of
 “ which this Author is every where full) led
 “ him into an Opinion of the Possibility of an
 “ *actual Separation* of an *essential Property* from
 “ the Essence or Substance itself, and into a
 “ belief that *Thinking* could become a *superadded Property* of Matter, without superadding
 “ at

“ at the same time, the spiritual or thinking
“ *Substance.*” *

P. What Mr. *Locke's* Belief was in this respect, we have sufficiently considered. † But what this *absurd Notion* of an *Abstraction* utterly impossible can mean, I am really at a loss to know. — For if by this be meant, that Mr. *Locke* every where supposed that *Essential Properties* could in their Nature exist separately from the Substance; — then he is so far from being every where full of such a Notion, that he is every where full of the contrary. || — But if by such an *absurd Notion* this learned Writer means, that *Essential Properties* may be actually separated from the Substance; then the Notion which led Mr. *Locke*, and the Opinion, into which he was led, were only one, and the same Thing. For his Notion that *Essential Properties* might be actually separated from the Substance, led him into an Opinion that they might be actually separated.

But however, let this Notion of an *Abstraction* utterly impossible be what it will, Mr. *Locke* it seems, was led into it, by not rightly distinguishing between the Possibility of considering Properties, without considering the Substance it self, and the Impossibility of Properties existing separately from it. — It can by no means, says Mr. *Locke*, enter into my Mind, that Thought should exist by itself. ** — Again, “ we experience in ourselves Thinking; the Idea of this

* Procedure, p. 444, 445.

† Dialogue the first,

|| H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 2, 3, 4, 6, 15, 37.

** Letters to Limborch, p. 429.

“ Action or Mode of Thinking, is *inconsistent*
 “ with the *Idea* of Self Subsistence, and there-
 “ fore has a *necessary Connection* with a Support
 “ or Subject of Inhæfion.”*——What say you,
Crites, is it likely, that Mr. *Locke* could fall in-
 to any *profound Error*, for want of *distinguishing*
 as this Gentleman supposes? Or does he seem to
 have wanted Information, that *Thinking* could
 not exist *separately* from a Substance?——As
 to the *plain Man*, he would certainly have rea-
 son to *laugh*;——but then, *Crites*, I cannot
 allow him to *laugh* at Mr. *Locke*, because he has
 no where told him, that his *Morsel of Bread* was
 only a *Parcel of Properties* without a Substance.

C. But then there is this Contradiction, which
 the learned Author charges upon Mr. *Locke's*
 Hypothesis; to wit, “ That the same Faculty
 “ of Reason shall be *essential* to a System of
 “ Matter, and yet only *accidental* and *superadded*
 “ to the same System by Almighty Power:
 “ —— For that *Thinking* is *essential* to Man, I
 “ hope, says he, will be allowed by those, who
 “ contend for the Possibility of its being *super-*
 “ *added* to Brutes.”||

P. It is *allowed* that *Thinking* is *essential* to
Man, who is a *Thinking Being*, and *non-essential*
 to a System of Matter, which is no *Thinking Be-*
ing; but how will it follow that——therefore
 the Faculty of *Thinking* shall be *essential* and *non-*
essential to the *same System* of Matter?——Sure-
 ly the learned Author could not suspect, that
 Mr. *Locke* did not *rightly distinguish* between

* First Letter to Bishop *Stillingfleet*, p. 64, 65. See also
 H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 13. § 13. || Procedure, p. 192.

Man and a *System* of *Matter*, but took them both for one and the same Thing. And unless this were really the Case, it is impossible to see, how Mr. *Locke* has made *Thinking essential* and *non-essential* to the same *System* of *Matter*. Nor is it easier to comprehend how this Contradiction is fixed upon him, by his supposing that *Brutes* may think.*

C. However, “ If it is as easy for God to “ superadd to *Matter* a *Power* of *Thinking*, as “ to superadd a spiritual *Substance*, or *Being*; “ then is not the latter altogether unnecessary, “ as this Writer maintains, and therefore im- “ probable? ” †

P. I wish this Gentleman had given his Reasons, why of these two Things, supposed equally easy, the latter must be altogether unnecessary, and improbable. — Surely an immaterial Substance united to Body could not be attended, in its Operations, by any greater Difficulties, or prove a greater Weight or Incumbrance to the Body, or be in any Respect, less worthy the Wisdom of God, than a Faculty of *Thinking*. — Mr. *Locke* thought an immaterial Substance much more probable; and I must venture to think he was most in the right.

C. But what have you to offer against this, *Philander*? “ In pursuance of a long Chain of “ Ideas, says our Author, Men have presumed “ in the Face of common Sense and Reason, to “ lay down this monstrous Position magisterially “ and with great Positiveness, — That we

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 1. § 19. B. 2. c. 11. § 11.

† Procedure, p. 167.

“ have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit, as
 “ we have of Body.* The shortest way to con-
 “ fute this *Absurdity*, is what the Philosopher
 “ took with him, who denied there was any
 “ such Thing as Motion, by rising up and
 “ walking before him. So I would place an
 “ human Body before the Eyes of any one,
 “ who maintains this Assertion, and then re-
 “ quire him to place a Spirit before my Eyes.”†

P. Tell me, *Crites*, have we not as clear and distinct Ideas of *Scents* and *Tastes* and *Sounds*, as we have of *Colours*? —

C. Undoubtedly, *Philander*.

P. But unless you can place these before the Eye, your Opinion seems in the same Circumstances with Mr. *Locke's monstrous Position*; and both are in equal Danger from the same short Way of confuting.

C. However to shew that we have no Idea of the Substance or Properties of Spirit, he rightly observes in another Place, that “ we
 “ can discern one and the same bodily Substance
 “ with all our five Senses; but that we cannot
 “ discern a pure Spirit by any one of them, nor
 “ by all of them together.”||

P. Pray, *Crites*, have you any Idea, Conception, or Notion of the Disagreement between right Reason and Injustice?

C. I think a very plain one.

P. But by how many of the five Senses may you discern this Disagreement?

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 5—30.

† Procedure, p. 74.

|| Procedure, p. 442.

C. Perhaps, *Philander*, you will not approve of what this learned Writer says elsewhere; to wit, that he “cannot forbear again remarking the “*shameful Inconsistency* of those Men, who maintain that we have as *clear* and *distinct* an *Idea* of *Spirit* as we have of *Body*; because we have as *clear* and *distinct* an *Idea* of *Thinking*, as we have of *Extension* or *Solidity*: And who at the same time argue the Soul may be material, because God can superadd to Matter the Power of Thinking. For is not *Thinking* and *Willing* even in their Hypothesis, opposed to *Extension* and *Solidity*, as *essential Properties* utterly incompatible in the same Being?—— And how then can Thinking be superadded to Matter, without making it a Spirit?”*

P. Why, Mr. *Locke* certainly thought it would.†——However, do not mistake him, *Crites*. For when he supposed that *Thinking* thus superadded would make a *Spirit*, he does not mean it in the highest Sense of that Word, but only in much the same Sense, as the learned Author calls the Soul a *Spirit*,——and which he affirms to be *Matter* and *Spirit* in *essential Union*.||——But how can *Thinking* and *Willing* be opposed in that Hypothesis, to *Extension* and *Solidity*, as *essential Properties* utterly incompatible in the same Being,——When it does not suppose there is any *real* Being without some Sort of *Extension*?‡ And moreover *Extension* and *Solidity* in that Hypothesis, are very diffe-

* Procedure, p. 150, 151. † II's first Letter to Bishop *Stillingfleet*, p. 64, 65. || Procedure, p. 224.

‡ II. Understanding, B 2 c. 15 § 2, 3, 11.

rent Things.* — For though Mr. *Locke* does not seem to suppose there is any *Thinking* Being without *Extension*; yet he was far from supposing that either inferred *Solidity*.† So that *Thinking* still remains a distinguishing Mark of *Spirit*. And I really cannot see, *Crites*, but we may have as clear and distinct an Idea of *Spirit*, as of *Body*, notwithstanding this Charge of shameful Inconsistency, or any Thing said in support of it.

C. But “if this be true, then as our Author observes, we should have as direct and clear and distinct and adequate a Knowledge of all created Spirits, and as clear and direct Evidence of their Existence and true Properties, as we have of Body.” ||

P. How so, good *Crites*? Have we then, according to Mr. *Locke*, This Knowledge of all created Bodies? Or this Evidence of their Existence and true Properties? Did ever Mr. *Locke* maintain this? † — Or is this so in Fact? If neither be true; how does this universal Knowledge of *Spirit* follow from any thing Mr. *Locke* has said? — He supposes indeed, “we have as many and as clear Ideas belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body; the Substance of each being equally unknown to us.”** And how does it yet appear, that he was mistaken?

C. Give me leave, *Philander*, to observe, that our Author speaking of Mr. *Locke*’s Notion concerning our Idea of Spirit, thus expresses

* B. 2. c. 4. § 5. B. 2. c. 13. § 12. † B. 2. c. 23. § 32. || Procedure, p. 122. ‡ H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 3. § 25, 26. ** B. 2. c. 23. § 28.

himself;

himself; — “ The same Argument for the
 “ Proof of that *ridiculous* Position, that we
 “ have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit as we
 “ have of Body, is varied thus, — *A solid ex-*
 “ *tended Substance is as hard to be conceived, as a*
 “ *thinking immaterial Substance*, say the Affir-
 “ ters of it — How great a Solæcism and
 “ Contradiction a *thinking immaterial Substance*
 “ is, we have already seen; but letting that
 “ pass, sure we know more of bodily Substance,
 “ than we do of spiritual.” *

P. Pray, Crites, where does the *Affirter* of
 that *ridiculous* Position suppose a *thinking imma-*
terial Substance to be a Solæcism and Contradiction?
 How frequently does that *much injured* Man
 maintain the very reverse? So kind and well-
 grounded an Insinuation, perhaps the unprejudiced
 Part of the World will hardly let pass without
 some Notice. — But how is it, Crites, that we
 know more of bodily Substance, than we do of spiri-
 tual?

C. “ We know, says that learned Writer, by
 “ a *direct* and *proper* Idea, that Extension is a
 “ Quality essential to Body; but we are so far
 “ from knowing whether a pure Spirit be ex-
 “ tended or no, that there is no one essential
 “ Quality of it, which we do know by any di-
 “ rect and proper Idea at all, or by any Concep-
 “ tion whatsoever, as it is in its own Nature.” †

P. On the contrary I must beg leave to be of
 Opinion, that we have as clear Ideas or Concep-
 tions of *thinking* and *willing*, and their several
 Modes, as we have of *Solidity*. And that the

* Procedure, p. 77.

† Ibid.

former are as much the *essential* Qualities of *pure* Spirit, as the latter is of *Body*. As to *Extension* belonging to *pure* Spirit, Philosophers are indeed divided upon it;—However as we know many Qualities of *Spirit*, and are ignorant of many relating to *Body*,—If we carefully estimate the whole of our Knowledge and Ignorance, perhaps we shall find upon the Balance, that we have as little Reason to boast of our Knowledge in one Respect, as in the other.

C. But further our Author justly maintains, that even “supposing we had as *clear and distinct* Ideas of the Qualities or Operations of “our Mind, such as *thinking, knowing, doubting,* “and Power of *moving*, as of Corporeal Qualities; yet this would give us no Idea either “of the Qualities, or Substance of a Spirit: “For in Man, these are all the joint Operations of *Spirit* and *Matter* in essential Union “and Conjunction; which can give us no Ideas “of the Qualities and Operations of a Substance *purely immaterial*, and entirely independent of Matter.”* Again,—“*Thinking* is “the Action of *Matter* as well as *Spirit* operating together in essential Union.”†—And elsewhere, “*Thinking* or *Reasoning* is a mixed “and compound Act of both *Matter* and *Spirit*.—And further he with great Reason observes, that it has been the Occasion of numberless *Errors* and *Mistakes* in Religion, and “too many of them fatal, that Men have been “used to think and speak of the pure Spirit, or

* Procedure, p. 443. See also p. 79, 81, 192.

† Procedure, p. 450.

“superior

“superior Soul, as if its Operations were *now* in
 “all Respects the same, and as entirely inde-
 “pendent of Matter, as they will be when it is
 “in a State of *Separation*. Men commonly
 “speak of it, says he, as of something *within*
 “us, and not *of* us, as if it thought and reason-
 “ed *in* the Body, and not together *with* any
 “Part of it, as if the Body were a mere *Box*,
 “or *Cafe*, or *Place* of Residence for it. Not
 “considering that there is as much Truth in
 “saying, that the Body is *in* the Spirit, as in
 “saying that the Spirit is only *in* the Body,
 “though this sounds oddly to a vulgar Ear, or
 “indeed to any one, who is not capable of Un-
 “derstanding, that these two different Princi-
 “ples could not constitute one and the same in-
 “dividual Man, unless both were intimately
 “united in Operation and Essence.”* Moreover
 “he rightly affirms, that “the pure Intellect
 “must not be considered as a Being *disjoined*
 “and *separate* and acting by the Help of bodi-
 “ly Organs, as so many mere *Instruments*, by
 “which it performs all its Operations; for in
 “Truth and Reality. the Body is no more a
 “mere *Instrument* to the Soul, than the Soul is
 “to the Body; and that this is a plain Truth and
 “will be easily granted.”† And that “we
 “are to consider the pure Intellect and Mind
 “as a *Composition* of Spirit and Matter, in strict
 “and essential Union with one another; inso-
 “much that all their Operations are the joint
 “and inseparable Acts of both together, such
 “as could not proceed from Matter, or Spirit

* Procedure, p. 147, 149. † P. 153.

“ alone, and such as would be Operations of a
 “ quite different Kind, if the spiritual Part of
 “ us were to act by itself.”*

P. It must be owned *Crites*, that some Gentlemen have a peculiar Happiness in framing Hypotheses.—Whilst Mr. *Locke*’s Supposition is shamefully trifling, frivolous, and senseless,† changes the very *Essence* of Matter,‡ and confounds our *Ideas*.§——Whilst he himself becomes guilty of the same Contradiction, as to say that God should make the same Thing to be Matter and no Matter at the same time: the same Property essential and only accidental to the same System.** And has thus framed such a spiritual Matter or material Spirit, as is a shameful Absurdity and palpable Contradiction:*†——Our learned Author has so happily united the immaterial Substance,*‡ and Body, both in Operation and *Essence*, that though by this intimate Union and Conjunction, the Body is as much in the Spirit, as the Spirit is in the Body, and this no more a mere Instrument to the Soul, than the Soul is to that, and moreover though by this means, Thinking and all the Operations of the Mind are the joint and inseparable, the mixt and compound Act of Spirit and Matter,——The Soul being Matter and Spirit in essential Union,†*—and Thinking the Action of Matter, as well as Spirit.——All which, though to vulgar Ears, may sound as much like the *Essence* of Matter being changed, as much like Matter and no Mat-

* p. 155.

† Procedure, p. 165, 166. ‡ p. 444.

+ p. 151.

** p. 191, 192. *† p. 73.

* p. 151.

†* p. 201.

ter at the same time, and as much like *spiritual Matter* or a *material Spirit*, as Mr. *Locke's* System; yet Matter *thinking* in this Hypothesis does not only avoid the manifold Inconveniencies of the other, but even guards against *many fatal Errors and Mistakes in Religion*. Such are the *fatal* Consequences, which attend the Supposition that *Thinking* is the *sole Act* of an *immaterial Substance*! And such the Excellency of that Hypothesis, which makes *Thinking* the *Action* of *Matter* as well as *Spirit*!

And now, *Crites*, if it should be enquired how the *Spirit* and *Body* contribute their Assistance in these *compound* and *joint Acts* of *Thinking* and *Willing*, this Gentleman is very exact in describing the Proportions of each. — “They are principally and chiefly the Operations of the pure *Spirit*, in a *lesser* Degree, the Operations of the *animal Soul*; [that is, the *Spirit* and *Body* united,*] and *least* of all of the *Body*.”† — So that the *immaterial Spirit* is principally concerned, the *Body* the *least*, but these two united have a Share between both. — I shall not offer, *Crites*, to dispute these several Shares and Proportions, but only beg leave to say, that they must be very different Reasons, from what I have yet met with, which will ever convince me, that Matter can *think* at all, by Virtue of any *Union*, *Conjunction*, or *Concurrence* whatever. — Nothing appearing to me more demonstrable, than that *Thinking* is the *sole Act* of an *immaterial Substance*; howsoever joined or united to Matter. — For though in

* Procedure, p. 148, 353 † P. 371.

its present Circumstances, it must make use of *material Organs*, — and though the manner of its Union with the Body, is what lies far remote from our Knowledge, yet in my Opinion, we may with equal Propriety, call the Motion of a Chariot the *mixt and compound Action* of the Horses and Harness, or the walking of a Child in its little Machine, the *joint and compound Act* of both, or affirm that this is no more an *Instrument* to the Child, than the Child is to that, — As to call *Thinking, Willing, and Self-Motion*, the *joint Act* or *Operation* of *Spirit* and *Matter*. — Besides was it possible for Matter, by any Union with the *immaterial Substance*, to be capable of such *Powers, Qualities, or Operations*, yet as this material System had none of these before such Union, they must evidently proceed from that very *immaterial Substance*. — And if we make proper Allowances for the dead Weight, which this *joint-Operator* with the Soul often proves to it, in exerting its native Faculties, we cannot fail having very just *Ideas* of the Qualities and Operations of a Substance *purely immaterial*, and *intirely independent* of Matter.

As to what this Gentleman says, that “ these
 “ two different Principles [Spirit and Body]
 “ could not constitute *one and the same indivi-*
 “ *dual Man*, unless both were intimately united
 “ in *Operation* and *Essence* ; ” — I must beg
 leave to think, that *Spirit* and *Body* may do this,
 let the Manner of their Union be what it will.
 He seems to be *one and the same individual Man*,
 whose Body under any Changes or Alterations
 is actuated by *one and the same individual Spirit*,
 howsoever

howsoever the great Author of Nature has seen proper to unite them, or to settle those Laws, by which they mutually act upon, and affect each other.

C. But now as to *Thinking*, *Philander*, this learned Writer assigns several weighty Reasons, why it cannot belong to *pure Spirits*.—"We are sure, says he, that whatever the Manner of knowing is in *pure Spirits*, it is no more performed by *thinking*, than their Motion is by *walking*, or *running* or *flying*. Their way of Knowledge cannot be of the same Kind with our *thinking*, which is *successive*, and by the Concurrence of material Organs.—What an *extravagant* Thought is it then to imagine, that a *pure Spirit* *thinks*? It knows indeed, but we know not *how*; to be sure not by playing upon a Set of material Strings, exquisitely contrived and wrought up into a curious Contexture of bodily Parts for that Purpose."* Moreover, that "their Knowledge, as far as we can apprehend it, must be *intuitive* and *instantaneous*, whereas ours at the best is *successive*, and gradually performed by the concurrent Motion of some bodily Parts within us, which is the Cause of that *Labour* and *Weariness* we experience in the Act of *Thinking*."† — Again, "call the Knowledge of God and Angels by what Name you will, nay call it *Thinking*, it will end in the same Thing, for the *Manner* of it in God, and Angels, and Man, must be allowed as essentially different as their Nature,

* Procedure, p. 76, 77.

† p. 150.

“ so that *Thinking* in Man, can give us no *direct* “ Conception of *Thinking* in a pure Spirit.” *

P. Good *Crites*, what may be the Reason, that *pure* Spirits should not be allowed to *think* without these *material Strings*, as well as they are allowed to *know* without them? — Well but our *Thinking* is *successive*, and I suppose *pure* Spirits are not to have *successive* Thoughts. Pray, *Crites*, can there be *thinking* without *successive* Thoughts? If there may, the Want of these is no Argument that Spirits cannot *think*. — But if all *Thinking* be *successive*, a Reason is still wanting, why *successive Thinking* can have no place in Spirits. — However, their Knowledge is *intuitive* and *instantaneous*. One would be apt, *Crites*, to imagine, that there never could be wanting some Wonders of Creation or Providence, some Mysteries of infinite Power and Wisdom, which might sufficiently exercise the intellectual Faculties of the most exalted Class of Beings. — But supposing that every finite Spirit, when devoid of all Body, is able to comprehend all these, without any Study or Application whatever, and that their whole Knowledge is *intuitive* and *instantaneous*: — Can you seriously call this an Argument, that they are not able to *think*? Can you really conceive, *Crites*, that *pure* Spirits can *know* any Thing, which they never *contemplate*, *reflect* upon, or *attend* to? — Or that they can *contemplate* the Objects of their own Understanding; — that is, in other Words, can *think* † upon

* Procedure, p. 152.
c. 9. § 1. c. 19. § 1.

† See II. Understanding, B. 2.

them,

them, without *thinking*? Whoever can comprehend this, *Crites*, there are few Depths in Metaphysics, that will give him much Trouble. The *passive Union of nothing with nothing*, must prove but an easy Subject to employ his Meditations.

In short, *Crites*, if it be an Argument that pure Spirits *think* not, because they *think* not in our Way and Manner, with Labour and Weariness, and by the Concurrence of material Organs, it may be proved by the very same Argument, that they have neither Life or Knowledge. The same Reason will hold equally strong in both Cases: and therefore to *imagine* either, must be equally *extravagant*.



A VIN-



A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE, &c.

DIALOGUE V.

CRITES and PHILANDER.

Crit.



LET us now, if you please,
Philander, examine what Mr.
Locke says in relation to the
Deity.—He maintains, “it
“ is Infinity, which joined to
“ our *Ideas* of Existence,
“ Power, Knowledge &c. makes that *complex*
“ *Idea*, whereby we represent to ourselves the
“ best we can, the supream Being. For though
“ in his own Essence——God be simple and
“ uncompounded, yet——we have no other
“ *Idea* of him, but a complex one of Existence,
“ Knowledge, Power, Happiness, &c. infinite
“ and

“and eternal.”* — And elsewhere, that “we attribute these to all Sorts of *Spirits*, with the Difference only of Degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame as well as we can, an *Idea* of the first Being.”† — However, our learned Author not only observes, that “God is in himself *simple* and *uncompounded*, but moreover, because we have no *Idea* of him, as he is in his own uncompounded Essence, we conceive him the best we can by a very complex *No-tion*, by removing from him all the *Imperfections* of the Creatures, and attributing to him all their *Perfections*, and more especially those of our own Minds. Not by adding *Infinity* to each of them, as some assert, which is itself a *Negative*, and therefore can make up no *positive Idea* of the supreme incomprehensible Being.”‡ — And another ingenious Writer takes notice, that “*infinite*, when applied to the divine Attributes, doth not mean any *indefinite Addition* or *Encreasableness* of these several Attributes partially considered, but only an entire absolute *Perfection*, without any Kind of *Failure*, or *Deficiency* in these Respects. And thus as he instances out of the learned *Cudworth*, † — *infinite Understanding* and *Knowledge*, is nothing else but *perfect Knowledge*, that which hath no Defect or Mixture of *Ignorance* in it, or the Knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. Infinite

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 35.

† B. 3. c. 6. § 11. || Procedure, p. 82.

‡ Intellectual System, p. 648.

“ Power is nothing else but *perfect* Power, that
 “ which hath no Defect, or Mixture of *Impo-*
 “ *tency* in it: A Power of producing and doing
 “ all whatsoever is *possible*, *i. e.* whatsoever is
 “ *conceivable*, and so of the rest.” After which
 this Gentleman proceeds to observe, that “ this
 “ is not attempting to make the Attributes of
 “ God *positively infinite* by superadding a *nega-*
 “ *tive Idea* of *Infinity* to them, (as the Author
 “ of the Procedure, &c. justly urges against
 “ Mr. Locke, p. 82.) but it is making them
 “ positively and absolutely *perfect*.” *

P. I should really think, *Crites*, that Mr. Locke had so clearly explained himself, as to what he means by *infinite*, when applied to the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, and when applied to other Things, that there could be but little Room for any Objection.

“ Finite and Infinite seem to me, says Mr. Locke, to be looked upon by the Mind, as the *Modes* of *Quantity*, and to be attributed primarily in their first Designation only to those Things, which have Parts, and are capable of Increase or Diminution, by the Addition or Subtraction of any the least Part, and such are the *Ideas* of Space, Duration, and Number. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the Great God, of whom, and from whom are all Things, is incomprehensibly infinite, but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being, our *Idea* of infinite in our weak and narrow Thoughts,

* See Mr. Law's Notes on Archbishop King's Origin of Evil, p. 93—100.

“ we do it *primarily* in Respect of his Duration
 “ and Ubiquity, and I think more *figuratively* to
 “ his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other
 “ Attributes, which are properly inexhaustible,
 “ and incomprehensible, &c. For when we
 “ call them infinite, we have no other *Idea* of
 “ this Infinity, but what carries with it some
 “ Reflection on, and Intimation of that Num-
 “ ber or Extent of the Acts or Objects of
 “ God’s Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, which
 “ can never be supposed so great, or so many,
 “ which these Attributes will not always sur-
 “ mount and exceed, let us multiply them in
 “ our Thoughts, with all the Infinity of endless
 “ Number. — I do not pretend to say, how
 “ these Attributes are in GOD, who is infi-
 “ nitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capa-
 “ cities: They do without doubt contain in
 “ them all *possible Perfection*, but this, I say, is
 “ our Way of conceiving them, and these our
 “ *Ideas* of their Infinity.” *

Here then Mr. *Locke* observes, that *infinite*,
 when applied to these divine Attributes, is ra-
 ther *figuratively* used, — that it has a Reference
 to the *Acts* or *Objects* of them, — that they
 are themselves properly *inexhaustible*, and con-
 tain *all possible Perfection*. — And what can it
 be, *Critics*, to contain *all possible Perfection*, but
 to be *absolutely perfect*? — Again, “ our Rea-
 “ son, says he, leads us to the Knowledge of
 “ this certain and evident Truth, that there is
 “ an *eternal, most powerful, and most knowing*

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 17. § 1. See also § 6. and
 B. 3. c. 6. § 11.

“ Being.”* — In a Letter to his Friend *Limborch*, speaking of the Unity of God, he observes, that “ a Being, which is *altogether perfect*, or in other Words, *perfectly perfect*, can be but one. Because such a Being cannot want any Attributes, Perfections, or *Degrees* of Perfections, which it is better to have, than to be without. — Thus the having *all Power*, or the being omnipotent, is a greater Perfection, than *not* to have *all Power*. — By the same *Idea* of Perfection, we come to know, that God is *omniscient*. — And in another Place, having mentioned what he calls a Proof *à priori*, that the infinite, eternal, and independent Being is but one; — he *subjoins*, — to which if we add the *Idea* of all *possible Perfections*, we then have the *Idea* of an eternal, infinite, omniscient, and all-powerful God.”† — And therefore when Mr. *Locke* speaks of *infinite Wisdom* or *infinite Power*, what can he possibly mean else, than what the learned Dr. *Cudworth* calls *perfect Wisdom*, and *perfect Power*? — Upon the whole, I submit it, *Crites*, whether when Mr. *Locke* applies *infinite* to these divine Attributes, it be not more agreeable to his true Meaning, though he may in some Places be liable to be mistaken; || to understand him of that *positive*, or *metaphysical Infinite*, by which is meant *what is absolutely perfect in its kind, and which cannot admit of Addi-*

* H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 10. § 6. † Collection of Letters, p. 412—414. 423. || H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 33—35.

tion, or Increase.* And indeed the learned Translator of Archbishop King, though he gives into this Objection against Mr. Locke, yet seems very evidently to allow, that he alludes† to that *absolute* Infinity, or Perfection, which belongs to the divine Attributes. ||

But pray, *Crites*, let us hear the Author of the Procedure a little further upon this Subject. — “We behold [God’s] Wisdom in our *Thinking* and *Reasoning*, his Power in our worldly Dominion and Power, his Goodness in the Rectitude of our most commendable Passions and Affections. Not by adding *Infinity* to each of these, as some have grossly mistaken, so as to stretch our Imagination as far as we can to *infinite Thinking*, *infinite Strength*, *infinite Rectitude of Passions and Affections*; but by adding *Infinity* to those *incomprehensible Perfections* of the divine Nature, of which we have not the least *direct* Glimpse or Knowledge.” ‡

Infinite then is not here found fault with, as being a *Negative*, but as being improperly applied. As being applied to *Wisdom*, *Power*, and *Goodness*, instead of those *incomprehensible Perfections*, we have not the least *direct* Glimpse, or Knowledge of.

We are indeed elsewhere told, that “the Intellect infers and concludes that the supreme Being must have all *absolute* and *consummate*

* See the Notes on Archbishop King’s *Origin of Evil*, p. 15. And Dr. Cudworth’s *Intellectual System*, p. 648, 649.

† H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 17. § 1. 6.

|| See the Postscript to his Notes on Archbishop King, p. 3, 4.

‡ Procedure, p. 111, 112.

“ Perfections in himself.* — But what can we suppose the learned Author may mean by these *Perfections*? Since it is affirmed that “ the
 “ enlarging of *our* Perfections, either natural or
 “ moral, in their *literal* Sense, in Number or
 “ Degree only, to the utmost Stretch of our Ca-
 “ pacity and Understanding, and the attributing
 “ them *so* enlarged to God, is in Truth and
 “ Strictness no more than raising up to our-
 “ selves, an immense and *unweildy* Idol of our
 “ own Imagination, which hath no Foundation
 “ in *Reason* or the Nature of Things.”† So
 that *perfect* Power, *perfect* Wisdom, and *perfect*
 Goodness, if taken in their *literal* Sense, seem
 evidently to meet with no better Treatment,
 than the *negative* Infinite. They make up but
 an *immense* and *unweildy* Idol, and therefore can
 be no part of those *absolute* and *consummate* *Per-*
fections. — And indeed, *Crites*, it may appear
 a fruitless Labour to search after them, since it
 is not only maintained, that we have not the
 least *direct* Glimpse or Knowledge of them,
 but that we have *no* Idea or Conception of their
real and true Nature; ‡ — Nay that in Respect
 of *their real Nature*, as they are in themselves,
 we are as a Man *born blind*, in respect of Light
 or Colours.† And moreover our Notion or
 Conception of “ God, exhibits to us nothing
 “ of the *Reality* of his *true Nature*, *Substance*,
 “ or *Attributes*, as they are in *themselves*. Of
 “ which we have not the least *imperfect*, *obscure*,
 “ or *glimmering* Perception or Idea.”** — If

* Procedure, p. 455. † p. 85. ‡ p. 117—124.

† p. 127. ** p. 453.

Matters are really thus, how will the *adding* of *Infinity* to those *incomprehensible Perfections* of the divine Nature, enable us to *behold* either the *Wisdom*, the *Power*, or the *Goodness* of God? Or how can our *Knowledge* of these Things, be in any Respect, as the learned Author affirms it is, *true and real*? *

C. He has plainly pointed out the Way, *Philander*.—For though “ *these Perfections* are of “ a quite or totally different Kind, from what “ Power, Wisdom, and Goodness are in the “ Creature,† yet those *incomprehensible Perfections* in the divine Nature, are *answerable* to “ what *Power*, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness* are in us,— “ and these are the *true Resemblances* of those “ [divine Perfections.]||—And moreover, “ our Conceptions of human Wisdom are substituted to represent an *inconceivable* but *correspondent* Perfection of the divine Nature. “ And these our Conceptions and complex Notions are made use of to represent, with “ *some Resemblance or correspondent Reality and Proportion*, divine Things.” ‡ And thus, “ we may think and speak of them, with some “ Degree of *correspondent Exactness* and *Proportion*.” **——For “ by raising and transferring “ our Thoughts from the *literal strict Propriety* “ of those Words and Phrases, in which we express immaterial heavenly Things, to that “ *analogical Import and Signification* of them, “ they are as it were *sanctified* and *spirituali-*

* p. 113. † p. 84, 113, 138. || p. 84, 145.

‡ p. 107, 137, 138, 142.

** p. 108, 134, 137, 143, 144.

“zed.* And [thus] the Intellect may come to
 “a *solid and real Knowledge* of them.†

P. I am something apprehensive, *Crites*, that our *Knowledge* would by this means have a much nearer *Resemblance* and *Correspondence* with the *Knowledge* of the blind Man, who compared *Scarlet Colour* to the *Sound* of a Trumpet.‖ And indeed there is some Reason to suspect, that the learned Author’s *Idea* or Conception of *Knowledge* was not exactly the same, as what is commonly understood by that Word.—But however let *Knowledge* here stand for what it will, I must own, it has this plain Advantage, that it does not seem to require the Labour and Pains of *examining* and *comparing* our *Ideas* with one another. The *raising* and *transferring* our Thoughts from the *literal* to this *analogical* Import of Words, and thus *sanctifying* and *spiritualizing* of them, can only be difficult to those, who are resolved to have no *Knowledge*, *farther than they have Ideas*.‡——And though it may be objected, that no Method can be more opposite than this, to a Demonstration of these Things,——yet it should be remembred, that a *Demonstration* of them, is what this learned Writer is no Way solicitous about.**——Had Mr. *Locke*, and some other Authors been so happy as to have hit upon this Method; They had never incurred that Gentleman’s Displeasure for supposing the Being of a God, and the Truth of Morality were capable of demonstra-

* p. 199. † p. 474. ‖ H. Understanding, B. 3. c. 4. § 11. ‡ B, 4. c. 3. § 1, 2.
 ** Procedure, p. 234—248.

tive Evidence.—The Proof of these, it seems, amounting to no more than a *moral Certainty*,* —and to say that *natural Religion* or *Morality* is capable of *Demonstration*, is a *gross Opinion*.† —What an extraordinary Privilege, *Crites*, do some Writers appear to enjoy above others? Not all the Reasons offered by this Gentleman would have availed any Author, who had not already raised himself above all Suspicion.—Mr. *Locke* indeed talked not thus. —To his Honour be it said, he both thought and talked in a very different Manner.‖ He did most certainly entertain that *gross Opinion*, that *Morality* might be demonstrated, as well as *Mathematics*. His Reason was, because “the precise real Essence of the Things, moral
“ Words stand for, may be perfectly known;
“ and so the Congruity or Incongruity of the
“ Things themselves be certainly discovered,
“ in which consists perfect Knowledge.”‡ —Again, “the *Ideas* that *Ethics* are conversant
“ about, being all real Essences, and such as I
“ imagine, have a discoverable Connexion and
“ Agreement one with another; so far as we
“ can find their *Habitudes* and *Relations*, so far
“ we shall be possessed of certain, real and ge-
“ neral Truths: And I doubt not, but if a
“ right Method were taken, a great Part of
“ *Morality* might be made out with that Clear-
“ ness, that could leave, to a considering Man,
“ no more Reason to doubt, than he could have
“ to doubt of the Truth of Propositions in

* p. 237. † p. 234, 235. ‖ See the first Dialogue.
‡ H. Understanding, B. 3. c. 11. § 16.

“ Mathematics, which have been demonstrated
 “ to him.† — It has been, says he, generally
 “ taken for granted, that Mathematics alone,
 “ are capable of demonstrative Certainty: But
 “ — [as] whatever *Ideas* we have, wherein
 “ the Mind can perceive the immediate Agree-
 “ ment or Disagreement that is between them,
 “ there the Mind is incapable of intuitive Know-
 “ ledge; [so] where it can perceive the Agree-
 “ ment or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by
 “ an intuitive Perception of the Agreement or
 “ Disagreement they have with any intermediate
 “ *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demon-
 “ stration, which is not limited to *Ideas* of Ex-
 “ tension, Figure, Number, and their Modes.”*
 — Whether Mr. *Locke*, or the learned Au-
 thor, be mistaken, let some late excellent Wri-
 tings || decide the Question.

There is indeed one Reason this Gentleman gives, why the Being of a God is not strictly demonstrable, which is highly worth Notice.
 — “ This, he affirms, is plain from the ve-
 “ ry *Existence* of a Deity being revealed in
 “ Scripture by the Name, *I am*, which is in
 “ other Words, *I exist*; and from that Saying,
 “ *the Fool hath said in his Heart, there is no*
 “ *God.*” †

Because infinite Wisdom has declared in *Scripture*, that *he is*, or does *exist*, and Folly and Wickedness have in *secret* declared the contrary,

† B. 4. c. 1, 2. § 8. * H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 2. § 9. || See amongst others, Dr. *Clarke's* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, The Religion of Nature delineated, and Mr. *Hutchinson's* Idea of Beauty and Virtue.

↓ Procedure, p. 241, 242.

— therefore

— therefore it cannot be demonstrated that he *does* exist.

C. I must own, I cannot but highly approve of our learned Author's Thoughts, in relation to what Mr. *Locke* had laid down concerning the Deity, to wit, that "the enlarging or improving even our best *Ideas* and choicest Conceptions, in Degree alone, as far as we can extend them towards Infinity, is to make up an *unnatural hideous* Composition for our Notion of God. And that it is highly injurious to his Majesty and Excellency to apply any of those Words, with their proper and original Ideas or Conceptions, to his incomprehensible Perfections." And he gives these Reasons for his Opinion; — "for this is plainly, says he, no other than putting together so many *infinite Imperfections* of the Creature, to make up our complex Notion of the infinitely perfect Creator. And that though we could suppose all those preceding Instances, [Knowledge, Power, Goodness, &c.] to be real Perfections in us, and so far not unworthy of God; yet the very Addition of Infinity to each of them, would *entirely alter* their Nature, and render them Perfections of quite another Kind for nothing that is finite, can be of the same Kind, with that which is infinite."*

P. Upon a Supposition, *Crites*, that Matter was *Infinite*, can you really apprehend that it would be either more *immaterial*, or more *spiritual*, less *solid* or less *inactive* than what is fi-

* Procedure, p. 452.

nite? And yet without something of this Sort, it is hard to conceive how Matter could be *entirely altered* in its Nature, or become of *quite another Kind*, from what it is at present.—However, such it seems is the surprizing Force of *Infinite*, that when added to *real Perfections*, their *Natures* are *entirely altered*, and they become *Perfections of quite another Kind*.—I wish this learned Writer had told us, what *Kind of Perfections* we ought to esteem *Knowledge*, and *Power*, and *Goodness*, after their *Natures* are thus *entirely altered*.—As to Mr. *Locke*, his whole *Crime* in this Place, consists in the *Manner*, in which he has put together those many *infinite Imperfections* of the *Creature*, to make up our complex Notion of the Deity. It can, I think, be nothing else:—Since these very *Imperfections* may, according to the learned Author, become a “*mediate, indirect, and analogical Representation of the real, internal, and infinite Perfections of the divine Nature.*” * And thus “*denote and symbolize some real correspondent Perfections of the Divinity.*” † — He observing that “*there can be no Perfection in the Creature, any otherwise than as it bears some Resemblance or Similitude of him, who is the Fountain of it all.*” ‖ — That “*the Attributes of God are conceived by the Operations and Properties, and Affections of our Mind. [But indeed] That our immediate conscious Conceptions of the Mind, and all its Operations, together with all Ideas of Sensation, and the Terms expressing them, in their*

* Procedure, p. 448—453. † p. 456. ‖ Ibid.

“ first and proper Acceptation must be *removed*
 “ from the divine Nature, as so many *Imperfec-*
 “ *tions*, not only of the *Creature*, but of a
 “ Creature of a very low and *inferior* Degree:
 “ and whenever they are transferred to the Divi-
 “ ty, it must be by *Analogy* only.—And that
 “ these, when transferred to the divine Nature,
 “ do denote so many infinite *unknown Perfec-*
 “ *tions*, and are the very Ingredients, which
 “ make up our complex Notion of God.” *

So that all these *Perfections* or *Imperfections* in us, though of quite another *Nature* and *Kind* from the *infinite Perfections* of the Deity, yet transferred by *Analogy*, (which seems to have the same Efficacy with *infinite*) do denote so many *infinite unknown Perfections* of the Deity, do *symbolize*, and *correspond* with them, are an *analogical Representation*, and have a *Resemblance* or *Similitude* of them. And withal “ there is such
 “ a *secret Parity* of Reason, and *correspondent*
 “ *Analogy* between the Operations of our Mind,
 “ and the *infinite Perfections* of God, that it
 “ renders all our Conceptions and moral Rea-
 “ sonings concerning him, as *solid* and *true*, as
 “ if they did directly and immediately exhibit
 “ to us the *Reality* of his *internal Nature*.” †

That Mr. *Locke* supposed there was a *certain Analogy*, *Resemblance*, or *Similitude* between *Wisdom*, *Power*, and *Goodness*, as they are in the *Creature*, and *perfect Wisdom*, *perfect Power*, and *perfect Goodness*, as they are in the infinite Creator, I believe cannot be doubted. But that he had any Notion of this learned Author’s

* Procedure, p. 454, 455. † Ibid.

Analogy, or did in *his Way and Manner*, transfer human Perfections to the divine Nature, I think the warmest Friend Mr. Locke has, must not venture to affirm.—And hence it is that Mr. Locke has given us such “an *Idea* of the “Deity, which is in *Truth* and *Reality*, no “other than extending and aggravating so many *Infirmities* (even at the best) of our human “Nature, and carrying them on to a boundless “Degree, till they are monstrous beyond all “Imagination.”*

Unfortunate Mr. Locke! Those very *finite Perfections* of ours, which in other hands are so many *Representations* of the *infinite Perfections* of God, become by thy Management so many *infinite Imperfections*, an *unnatural hideous Composition*, human *Infirmities*, extended and aggravated, even carried on to a boundless Degree, and monstrous beyond all Imagination!

Homini homo quid præstat!

I must own, *Crites*, I do not wonder that this Gentleman is so offended at Mr. Locke, for maintaining that *if our Words do not stand for Ideas, they are Sounds and nothing else.*† Nothing can certainly be more dangerous than such a Maxim to the *analogical Dialect*.

But now, *Crites*, what a sad Expedient is it, to attempt the Defense of Religion, by putting out the Light of Reason and Revelation, and introducing universal Darkeness in its Room?

* Procedure, p. 450. † See the first Dialogue.

——What

—What a successful Method must it prove, to set about convincing Men of their Errors, (which appears to have been the Design of this Gentleman*) and to use such a Kind of Language for this Purpose, as must be found, upon Examination to have no Meaning at all?

Lyficles, who is defending Atheism in the *minute Philosopher*, scruples not to admit a Deity, provided he might dress him up with these *analogical* Perfections.† But the learned and celebrated Author of that Piece, who knew well the dangerous Tendency of such a Proceeding, soon put a Stop to his Triumphs, by discovering both the Original and Weakness of those Notions.‖ — “Although, says he, this Method of growing in Expression, and dwindling in Notion, of clearing up Doubts by Non-Sense, and avoiding Difficulties by running into affected Contradictions, may perhaps proceed from a well-meant Zeal, yet it appears not to be according to Knowledge, and instead of reconciling Atheists to the Truth, hath, I doubt, a Tendency to confirm them in their own Persuasion.”‡

C. But now, *Philander*, after our Author has enumerated those *Ideas*, which according to Mr. *Locke*, make up the complex Notion or *Idea* we have of God,** — he does, I think, with great Justice observe, — that “our *only* Perception of Pleasure and Happiness, which we have from a *Consciousness* of the Gratification

* See the Introduction to the Procedure.

† The minute Philosopher, Dial. 4. p. 243—249.

‖ p. 240—258. ‡ Ibid, p. 251.

** H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23 § 33—35.

“ of our Appetites and Passions and Desires is
 “ altogether unworthy of God.”* For surely,
Philander, the Man who would form a Notion
 of the *Happiness* of God, from the Gratifica-
 tions of his own *Passions*, *Appetites*, and *Desires*,
 must conceive very unworthily of that divine
 Being.

P. Most certainly, *Crites*, nothing can be
 more unworthy.—But where has Mr. *Locke* so
 much as intimated, either that our *only* Percep-
 tion of Pleasure and Happiness, arises from the
 Gratification of our *Appetites*, *Passions*, or *De-
 sires*? — Or that it is from these, we must
 take our *Idea* of the *Happiness* of God? — Do
 we experience no *diviner* Pleasures than such
Gratifications? Or does it appear that Mr. *Locke*
 was acquainted with no other?

He tells us, that “ the highest Perfection of
 “ intellectual Nature lies in a careful and con-
 “ stant Pursuit of *true* and *solid* Happiness.†
 Moreover, that “ Happiness is the Name of
 “ that, the utmost Bounds whereof we know
 “ not; — it is *what Eye hath not seen, Ear*
 “ *hath not heard, nor hath entered into the Heart*
 “ *of Man to conceive.*” || — And again, “ We
 “ may find, says he, another Reason, why God
 “ hath scattered up and down several Degrees of
 “ Pleasure and Pain, in all the Things that en-
 “ viron and affect us, and blended them toge-
 “ ther, in almost all that our Thoughts and
 “ Senses have to do with; that we finding Im-
 “ perfection, Dissatisfaction, and Want of com-

* Procedure, p. 452.
 c. 21. § 51

† H. Understanding, B. 2.
 || Ibid. § 41.

“pleat Happiness, in all the Enjoyments the
“Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek
“it in the Enjoyment of him, *with whom there*
“*is Fulness of Joy, and at whose right Hand are*
“*Pleasures for evermore.*”*

There is something so *just* and *beautiful* in this Thought of Mr. *Locke*, that it is impossible to read this Passage, without being greatly affected by it.—Surely, *Crites*, these appear not to be the Sentiments of a Man, whose Conceptions of Happiness were only worthy of a *Brute*.—For certainly that Person deserves not the Name of a *Man*, whose *only* Perception of Happiness and Pleasure arises from the Gratification of *Passions, Appetites, and Desires*.

And now, *Crites*, I must beg leave to take Notice, that Mr. *Locke* stands plainly charged by this Gentleman with “supposing, that we
“may come by as clear and distinct an *Idea* of
“the very Substance of God, as we have of
“the Substance of a Fly or a Pebble; —And
“that this in pursuance of that *detestably false*
“*Maxim*,—*That we have no Knowledge beyond*
“*our simple Ideas.*”†

It would be something extraordinary, if we met with any *Maxim* or Notion of Mr. *Locke*, without the Addition of some *graceful Ornament* or other.—That this might appear *detestable* to that learned Writer, I make little Question: a Reason has been already suggested, || why no such *Maxims* could be *agreeable*.—As to the *Falsity* of it, if nothing more be meant, than

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 7. § 5.

† Procedure, p. 453. || Above

that we have no Knowledge beyond our Ideas, enough has been already said * to discover the Mistake of that Gentleman.—As to the Supposition itself, which is said to be in pursuance of that *Maxim*, we have it in another Place thus varied,——“could any one have imagined, “that by a dextrous jumble of Ideas, Men “should go about to make us believe, that we “are as ignorant of the *Essence* of a Pebble, or a “Fly, as we are of the *Essence* of God.?” †

Whereas, on the contrary, Mr. *Locke* speaking of the divine *Essence*, thus expresses himself, with the greatest Reverence,——*which certainly we do not know, not knowing the Essence of a Pebble or a Fly, or of our own selves.* ‡ What is here shocking or offensive, *Crites*, to the most pious or tender Mind? What more shocking or offensive than the *Turn* given to those Words in both Places?

But perhaps the learned Author had not his Eye so much upon those Passages, as on Mr. *Locke's* Notion in general, that the *Substance of Body as well as Spirit is equally unknown to us.* †

Suppose it so, *Crites*.——Why would not that Gentleman condescend to acquaint his Reader with what he meant? And that he did not design to tax Mr. *Locke* with maintaining those indecent Positions, or with talking so lightly and irreverently of the divine *Essence*?——This surely would have been but highly reasonable,——since that learned Writer so much de-

* See the third Dialogue. † Procedure, p. 79.

‡ H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 35.

† H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 23. § 4, 5, 15, 28.

*clined citing either the Place or Page, from whence the Quotations are taken.** For such a Method renders it exceedingly difficult for a Reader to know, whether an Author maintains a Thing himself, or whether it be only maintained for him.—I would be far from so much as insinuating that this Gentleman did ever *designedly* quote wrong.—But I believe, it must be allowed, to be much the more honourable Method, where we bring any Charge against a Writer, to cite the very Place, upon which we found it. By this means, the Publick to whom we appeal, can very easily judge, how well the Accusation is supported; and whether the Warmth of Controversy, does not sometimes make us forget ourselves.

* Introduct. p. 46.





A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. *LOCKE*, &c.

DIALOGUE VI.

CRITES *and* PHILANDER.

Crit.



AS to Brute Animals, *Philander*, I know Mr. *Locke* is pleased to tell us that “Dogs and
“Elephants give all the De-
“monstration imaginable that
“they *think*, except only tel-
“ling us that they do so.* And that if Brutes
“have any *Ideas* at all, and are not bare Ma-
“chines, (as some would have them) we can-
“not deny them to have some Reason. It
“seems as evident to me that they do reason,

*-H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 1. § 19.

“ as that they have Sense, but it is only in particular *Ideas*, just as they received them from their Senses.”* And elsewhere, that it “ cannot with any Appearance of Reason be supposed, (much less proved) that Birds, without Sense and Memory, can approach their Notes, nearer and nearer by Degrees, to a Tune played yesterday, which if they have no *Idea* of in their Memory, is now nowhere, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to, since there is no Reason, why the Sound of a Pipe, should leave Traces in their Brains, which not at first, but by their after-Endeavours should produce the like Sounds, and why the Sounds they make themselves, should make Traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe, is impossible to conceive.”† — But our learned Author, though he allows *Sensations*,‡ and sensitive *Perceptions*§, to Brute Animals, yet he rightly supposes them to be mere Matter,** and does not admit that they have Memory properly so called,*† nor Reason,*‡ nor a Power of moving themselves, “ though they may be said to move *of themselves*, as a Clock cannot in any Propriety of Speech be said to move itself, though it moves of itself by the Force of Spring, or Weight, or Pendulum. And do we think, says he, that God cannot inconceivably form a Piece of Clock-

* B 2 c 11. § 11.

† B. 2. c. 10. § 10.

‡ Procedure, p. 153.

§ p. 169.

** Ibid.

*† p. 159-162.

*‡ p. 192.

“ Work, which shall go of itself, and perform
 “ all its Motions (if I may be allowed so dis-
 “ tant a Comparifon) for ten or twenty or
 “ thirty, or even an hundred Years together?
 “ And to carry on the Similitude, would it
 “ come much fhort of Frenzy in Men, to ar-
 “ gue that a Clock, muft have fome Degree of
 “ Reason, and Memory, and an *immaterial* Prin-
 “ ciple in its Compofition, becaufe it moves of
 “ *itfelf*? ” *

P. I do agree, *Crites*, that thus to *argue* would not certainly be *much fhort of a Frenzy*.
 — But to compare that almoft infinite Variety of Motions, which we find belongs to Brute Animals, and which Motions muft be allowed to have confiderable Evidence of being fpontaneous; — To compare thefe with the Motions of a *Clock*, feems to *argue* that fome Gentlemen, how free foever from a *Frenzy*, are fhangely wedded to an Hypothefis. — As to what God Almighty *can* do, there is not the leaft Doubt, but he *can* do every Thing, which implies not a Contradiction. But it is much that this learned Writer fhould here have Recourfe to the Power of God, who within three or four Pages urges againft Mr. *Locke*, that *the true Queftion is*, “ What Almighty Power *hath* done, and not what it *can* do.” † — But pray, *Crites*, how is it, that *Senfations* and *Perceptions* belong to Brutes, who are maintained to be *mere Matter*? Are thefe the Properties of Matter? Or if they be fuperadded, how are Brutes *mere Matter*?

* Procedure, p. 162, 163. † p. 167.

C. They are neither the Properties of mere Matter, nor are they *superadded*. “ There is, “ says our Author, no Propriety in that Phrase “ of *sensitive Perception being superadded to Mat-* “ *ter*, any more than in saying, that *Motion* “ *and Sound are superadded to the Matter of a* “ *Clock*. Motion and Sound are essential to a “ *Clock*, but not to the *Matter* of it. Sensitive Perception is *essential* to Brutes, not as “ they are Matter, but as they are a System of “ Matter, under a certain Modification, and “ Contexture, and Motion of its Parts. But “ all this is unravelled again, and entirely ceases with the Dissolution of the Frame.” And moreover he observes, “ that this *sensitive Perception* cannot be said to be *superadded* to “ Matter, in the same Sense that some Men “ suppose Thinking may be so : — And that “ we cannot suppose the Absurdity and Contradiction to be the same in both Suppositions.” *

P. Liberty of Will, *Crites*, was not ascribed to Atoms, as Atoms, but only to Atoms in such a particular Direction.† And I must beg leave to insist upon it, that a *Declination* of Atoms from a right Line, is as likely to produce *Liberty of Will*, as Matter under any *Modification*, *Contexture*, or *Motion*, is to produce *Sensation* or *Perception*. — Nor need this Gentleman have taken so much Pains, to shew the Difference between his *sensitive Perception*, and Mr. *Locke's superadded Faculty of Thinking*; ||

* Procedure, p. 169, 170. † Lucret. l. 2. Cicer. de Fato et Naturâ Deor. l. 1. || Procedure, p. 167 — 170.

— For since Mr. *Locke* does not make Thinking *essential* to Matter, under any *Modification* or *Contexture* whatever, the Difference between them is too visible, to need any laborious Proof.

C. But let us, *Philander*, hear the learned Author explain himself as to these *Sensations* and *Perceptions*.—It is certain, that he allows to Brutes, a *mere mechanical* Perception of external Objects.* And says, “*They are capable of all the Sensations that are in us. But that this is no more in them, than the striking of one material Substance upon another.*† And that there “is an essential Difference between a simple *Apprehension* of the Mind, and a simple *Perception* of the Sense. That the former is a *Perfection* of an human Soul, and that it apprehends, an *Idea*, that is already made and presented to its View, but the other is common to us with Brutes.”‡——Of *simple Perception* he gives this Instance, —“when by “looking upon an human Body, a Representation or Similitude of it is transmitted “through the Eyes to the Imagination; this is “the Cause of a *new* Idea, in which the pure “Intellect hath no Part, it contributes nothing “to the Production of that Idea, and it is “formed without the least Act or Concurrence “of the Mind.”§

P. If a Brute, after the Representation of an Object be transmitted through the Eyes, has no View of such Image, he can no more be said to have any *Perception* of the Object, than a white Wall or Paper has of a Man, whose Image or

* *Procedure*, p. 155. † p. 158. ‡ p. 156. § *Id. Ib.*
Picture

Picture they receive in a dark Room.—If this be the State of Brute Animals; what can this Gentleman mean by allowing them *Perceptions*, and *all the Sensations that are in us*? But if they really do *perceive* such Images, which are thus painted upon the Bottom of the Eye, is it possible they should do this, without *apprehending* them? — Whatever is let in by the Organs of Sense, if the Mind *perceives* or *apprehends* it not: — by which I mean, if it does not *discern* or take *Notice* of it, — it is no more an *Idea* of the Mind, at that time, than Colours are the *Ideas* of the Canvas they lie on. The Passage of the Rays of Light through the Eye, and the Refractions they meet with, and the Figures they form upon the Retina, are indeed all done mechanically. As mechanically as the same Figures are formed by means of an artificial Eye in the Shutter of a Room. Thus far here is nothing but *the striking of one material Substance upon another*; but good Crites, what has all this to do with *Perception* or *Sensation*? If Brutes have these, there must be something more than Matter *striking* upon Matter. For Sound will as soon *strike* out Colour, as Matter can one single *Perception* or *Sensation*. — Or shall we say, that the *Phantasm* or Appearance, is the *very Sensation* or *Act of Sensation* itself? * And thus make no Difference between the *Image*, and the *discerning* of it?

* Phantasma est sentiendi Actus. Hobbs de Sensatione et Motu animali. — Apparitio hæc sive Phantasma est id quod vocamus Sensationem. Idem in Leviath. c. 1.

C. Alas! *Pbilander*, the learned Author has obviated all these Objections. He supposes
 “that the *Perceptions* of Brutes *entirely differ*
 “from human, and are quite of another Kind.
 “That they are something *correspondent* only
 “and *Analogous* to *Sensation* in Man, as natural
 “Instinct is to Reason. And that their *Sensa-*
 “tions may be all as *real* as ours, and yet be of
 “a very *different Kind*, and that it is plain,
 “they can have no such *Consciousness* of their
 “own *Sensations*, as we have of ours.” And
 withal he observes, that whenever he uses the
 Words *Knowledge*, or *Discerning*, or *Distinguish-*
ing, or *Action*, as applied to Brutes, he does
 not mean that they have any “such Powers
 “properly speaking, as those which are called
 “by the same Names in Mankind; but only
 “that these are the best *analogous Notions* and
 “Words we have, to represent those *Movements*
 “of theirs, which seem to *mimick* the *Actions*
 “and *Faculties* of Men.”*

P. To maintain, *Crites*, that Brutes are ca-
 pable of all the *Sensations* that are in us, — that
 these are as *real* in them as in us, and many of
 their *Senses* more acute;† and yet that these
Sensations and *Perceptions* do *entirely differ*, and
 are of a *different Kind* from ours, and that they
 can have no such *Consciousness* of their own *Sensa-*
tions, as we have of ours, — to say that a
 Dog *knows*, or *discerns*, or *distinguishes* his Mas-
 ter in a Crowd from all other Men;‡ — but
 however that *they have no such Powers properly*

* Procedure, p. 171. † p. 158, 170, 394.

‡ p. 160, 161, 188, 189.

speaking, and that *these Movements only seem to mimick the Actions and Faculties of Men*; and yet that the *simple Perception of Sense is common to us with Brutes*,* and that *this is a Perception of the Object by the Idea*.† And moreover that though Brutes cannot *distinguish* all the Individuals *inwardly*, yet they may *distinguish* all the Individuals of the whole Species *outwardly*. || — If these, *Crites*, are really the best *analogous Words and Notions* we have, to represent these Things by, — I submit, whether it be in the Power of any *Words or Notions* whatever, to represent them worse, or to convey less Light into the Understanding? And therefore, whether all such *analogous Words and Notions* should not be abandoned by every Gentleman, who takes a real Pleasure in thinking *clearly*, and talking *intelligibly*? But dear *Crites*, as what Mr. *Locke* has offered in relation to Brutes, is easy to be understood; I beg you would not attack his Arguments in an unknown Tongue.

C. Well, *Philander*, but our learned Author further maintains, and with great Reason, that “all that *Knowledge* in Brutes, which is called “*Instinct*, is really no other, than a *Calculation* “or *Disposition* of their Senses, by the Author “of Nature, to excell in those particular Instances of *Sensation*, wherein the *Being* or “*Preservation* of every Species is most concerned.”**

P. Good *Crites*, what clear Conceptions can you possibly frame of a *Calculation* or *Disposition* of the Senses, to excell in particular *Sensations*,

* p. 156. † p. 394. || p. 437. ** p. 158.

when

when by *Sensations* is not meant *Sensations*, but something *entirely different from them*?

C. I hope, *Philander*, what follows will be plain enough. — He affirms that these Creatures “are never actuated or influenced by more
“than *one* simple Idea at a Time, nor by that
“neither, but when there is some *actual Impres-*
“*sion* of the external Object to stir it up with-
“in them, or some *Remains* of the Impression
“continuing in the Imagination and Brain, and
“that all they perform is at the *Impulse* and
“*Instigation* of particular Ideas of Sensation,
“which is the only *Direction* they have in all
“their Operations. — For this Reason Brutes
“can have no such Thing as *Memory* properly
“so called, for after the Impressions are made,
“or the *Ideas* formed, they lie in their Imagi-
“nation, (without any Notice or Observation)
“to sway and direct their Motions, as long as
“they last: But their Ideas decay gradually, so
“as never to be revived again by any proper
“*Recollection*, and must be renewed by a Re-
“petition of the same, or of a like Impression,
“from the Presence of the Object, which is as
“different from *Memory*, as natural Instinct
“is from Reason.”*

P. As to Brutes having *Ideas without any No-*
tice or Observation of them, I must refer to what
has been already said. And as to their *Memory*,
I shall venture to leave this Gentleman’s Argu-
ments against it, with Mr. *Locke*’s for it. Since
Birds endeavouring to imitate the Sounds, they
are taught, and to correct their own Mistakes

* Procedure, p. 158, 159.

from time to time, is a much stronger Evidence they have *Memory*, as well as a *Consciousness* of what they are about, than a whole Volume of bare Assertions will ever be able to overturn.

C. What follows, *Philander*, seems to me perfectly just. “Brutes, says our Author, are “moved by the *internal* Impulse of those Ideas, “which they have got from the Impressions of “outward Objects, while those Ideas last, “though the Objects are *absent*, as well as when “they are present: just as the Motions of a “*Watch* are not only varied immediately by the “Finger from *without*, while it actually touches “the Machine, but also by the Impression *left* “upon the Spring by the Hand, after it is re- “moved. All the Actions of Brutes are from “a Necessity of Nature; they cannot act *other- wise* than they do, in the same Disposition of “the Parts, whereof they are compounded, “and under the same Impressions from external “Objects.—They cannot be said to *intend* or “*design* any Motion, one Moment before they “move, nor can they of *themselves* alter any “particular Motion or change it for another.”* Again, “all the Impressions made upon the Or- “gans of Sensation in Brutes, and the *Ideas* con- “sequent to those Impressions are really to be “considered as abstractedly, and as much sepa- “rated from any Concurrence or Observation “of a true Principle of *Reason* and Under- “standing, as the Sound and Motions of a “Clock.”†

* p. 163, 164.

† p. 171.

P. I really, *Crites*, can discern but one Reason, why Things must be thus, and that is, the learned Author's Hypothesis could not otherwise subsist. But pray, *Crites*, does not this Gentleman seem to make mere *Machines* of these poor Animals, since they are necessarily determined in all their Motions, by the Impulse of their *Ideas*, nor have a Power to move themselves, nor to alter any particular Motion?

C. There is your Mistake, *Philander*. — I thought I should have you at last. “ Those
 “ Men, says our Author, run into an unrea-
 “ sonable Extream on the other hand, who to a-
 “ void the Souls of Brutes being immaterial,
 “ will have them to be no other, than a more
 “ refined and complicated Sort of *Engines* or *In-*
 “ *struments*, and call them mere *Machines*, or
 “ *Puppets*, or *Clock-Work*, as if the Wisdom
 “ and Power of the great Creator in the Dispo-
 “ sition of Matter and Motion, were to be di-
 “ rected by the Rules of our Mechanics, and
 “ confined to observe the Measures of human
 “ Artifice and Contrivance. As if God could
 “ not after an *inconceivable* Manner, work up a
 “ System of mere Matter into a Brute, and by
 “ a curious Disposition and Contexture of all its
 “ Parts, vastly out of the Reach of our Com-
 “ prehension, could not render it in a particu-
 “ lar Manner susceptible of such Motions and
 “ Impressions from external material Objects,
 “ as may be the impulsive Cause of all that Va-
 “ riety of Actions we see in them, and particu-
 “ larly of those, which have so near and lively
 “ a Resemblance of our human Sensations. So
 “ that all the Arguments to prove Brutes mere
 “ *Machines*

“ *Machines and Engines*, in the common Acceptation of those Terms, are precarious and imaginary, and the Words carry with them an odious, though tacit Comparison between the Art and Contrivance of Man, and the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, whenever they are used otherwise, than as bare *Illustrations* only of the Actions of Brutes.”*

P. So that after all, it appears at last, that Brutes are not Machines made by Men, but Machines effected by divine Art! Did ever any Cartesian make less of them?†

Whatever has a Power, *Crites*, of directing, altering, beginning, or stopping its own Motions, is no *Machine*; whatever has not, is no more than a *Machine*, let its *Mechanism* be never so far beyond the Reach of human Art or Contrivance. And here again, this Gentleman seems to overlook what he calls *the true Question*; and just after he has corrected Mr. *Locke*, for having recourse to the Power of God, || he has recourse to it himself.

C. But what say you, *Philander*, to our Author's Observations elsewhere?——“ They, says he, who hold *sensitive Perception* in Brutes, to be an Argument of the *Immateriality* of their Souls, find themselves under a Necessity of allowing those Souls to be *naturally immortal* likewise, and that they are embarrassed in thinking how to dispose of those *irrational immortal* Souls after the Dissolution of their Bodies.——But that if those Souls are once

* Procedure, p. 171, 172. † Lettres de Monf. Descartes, p. 337. et Dissertat. de Method. p. 44. || Procedure, p. 167

“ granted to be *immaterial*, it is utterly incon-
 “ ceivable, that they should not *naturally* have
 “ the same *Immortality*, with those which are
 “ human.—And that Brutes must [therefore]
 “ be sensible [hereafter] of *Happiness* or *Mis-
 “ ery*, and in some Degree liable to Rewards
 “ and Punishments, as eternal as their Souls.
 “ — And that what heightens the Absurdity
 “ of this Way of Thinking is, that in imagi-
 “ ning the Souls of Brutes to be *immaterial*,
 “ Men must necessarily distinguish a great *Vari-
 “ ety* of them both in Nature and Degree, one
 “ Sort for Birds, another for Beasts, and ano-
 “ ther for Fishes.—Nay every *Fly* and *Insect*
 “ must on this Supposition, have some Sort of
 “ *immaterial* Soul, even down to the *Cheese-Mite*;
 “ and what is yet more absurd is, that there
 “ must be an infinite Variety of *Immortalities*
 “ imagined to suit the Rank and Condition of
 “ every Individual, living, sensible Creature.”*

Again, “ What trifling is it to say [Brutes]
 “ reason but a *little*? They compare their *Ideas*
 “ but a *little*? They compound them but a *lit-
 “ tle*? For since material Objects can cause *Ideas*
 “ by making Impressions of themselves, but
 “ no mere Matter can operate upon those *Ideas*
 “ after they are once formed, then the Cause
 “ we reason more, and Brutes less, must be,
 “ either because their *Organs* are not so well dis-
 “ posed to act in Conjunction with an *immaterial*
 “ Principle, or because the *immaterial* Principle
 “ in them, is of a very *diminutive* Kind, or not
 “ quite so *immaterial* perhaps as ours. They

* Procedure, p. 173, 174.

“ who stretch their Zeal so far for making *Men*
 “ of Brutes, are the very Persons who labour
 “ to make *Brutes* of Men.” *

P. The learned Author mentions *Zeal* very opportunely: for surely nothing but an uncommon Degree of it could have brought in such a Charge in this Place, where he is examining those very Sections, which are as contradictory to such an Imputation, as Light is to Darkness. For Mr. *Locke* is there treating of the great Superiority of human Understanding over that of Brutes. † — But *Zeal*, *Crites*, will sometimes discover itself out of due Time and Place.

As to his Raillery, upon this Occasion, I beg leave to observe, that though to talk of the *immaterial* Souls of *Insects* and *Cheese-Mites* may afford Sport for a Materialist, yet they are not proper Arguments to those, who believe there must be a Principle *superior* to *Matter*, wherever they find *Sense* or *Perception*. — And such a Principle there may certainly be, how *embarrassed* soever Men find themselves, in *thinking how to dispose of it*. If we will but allow that the infinitely wise Creator knows *how to dispose* of his own Works, it is well enough. — We need not be surprized, *Crites*, if the *invisible* World should furnish out Difficulties, which our Ignorance cannot surmount. Nor need we go so far as to the *irrational Souls* of *Birds* and *Beasts* and *Fishes*, to exercise our lofty Understandings, since the very Feathers, and Hairs, and Scales of those Creatures, afford Matter

* p. 191. † H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 11. § 5—11.
 sufficient,

sufficient, to humble the Pride of the most exalted Genius.

C. But Mr. *Locke* having said that Brutes do *some* of them reason in *certain* Instances, as surely as they have Sense ; * Our learned Author very properly enquires,——“ If *some* Brutes reason, why not *all* Brutes? Or which are these “ Brutes, which do reason, and which do not? “ Which are the rational Brutes, and which are “ irrational? Which are the *certain* Instances in “ which they do reason, and which are to be referred to pure Instinct? Surely if *some* of “ them have Reason, they all have more or less “ of it, it is sure they are all directed in their “ Operations by one common Principle, whether that be Reason or Instinct.” † Again, “ Surely those Men, who contend for Brutes, “ having Degrees of *Reason*, cannot forbear “ fancying that they hear the Oxen *bellowing* “ Propositions, the Sheep softly *bleating* Propositions, and Lions roaring them out imperiously.——The partial Advocates for *Birds* “ and *Beasts*,——unmercifully excluding from “ this Privilege [of Reason] the whole Race “ of *Fishes*, which surely ought to be presumed “ as truly rational in their Way, though less “ able to *speak* for themselves.” ‡ And elsewhere he thus remarks,——“ What Extreams, “ says he, these Advocates for Brutes run into? “ They attribute *Thinking* or *Reason* both to “ Men and Brutes, as *mere Matter*.” **

* Ibid. § 11. † Procedure, p. 190. ‡ p. 434—436.

** p. 192.

P. This is an *Extream*, indeed *Crites*, who could have suspected, that those very *Advocates*, who maintain *mere Matter* to be of itself *incapable* of so much as *Motion*;* and others, who according to this Gentleman, ascribe even *immaterial Souls* to *Brutes*;—I say who could have suspected that these very Persons should attribute *Thinking* or *Reason* both to Men and Beasts as *mere Matter*? But it seems, this is not the only *Extream* these *Advocates* have run into. For though there must be, according to them, one Sort of *immaterial Souls* for *Birds*, another for *Beasts*, and another for *Fishes*,† yet they *unmercifully exclude the whole Race of Fishes from the Privilege of Reason*.—And therefore wonder not, *Crites*, if such whimsical Gentlemen should fancy they heard even the *Fish* themselves *bellowing*, and *bleating*, and *roaring out Propositions*.

As to that learned Writer's Assertion, that if *some* of these Creatures *have Reason*, they *all* have more or less of it;—It may be sufficient to observe, that Mr. *Locke* possibly not having observed *all*, he might chuse to confine his Discourse to his own Observations.—But when this Gentleman maintains, that “it is sure
“they are all directed in their Operations by
“one common Principle, whether that be *Reason* or *Instinct*;—It may I think be enquired, whether both Principles may not, at different Times, discover themselves in one and the same Being? That which directs a Creature,

* H. Understanding, B. 4. c. 10. § 10,

† Procedure, p. 173.

upon its first Appearance in the World, to whatever is for its Support and Preservation, and to avoid whatever may hurt or injure it, seems a distinct Principle from what afterwards influences or directs those Creatures, when they visibly show a Consciousness of Guilt, and endeavour to conceal it. When they discover such Love and Fidelity to their Masters, as to risque their own Lives, for the Defence of them, and their Properties.—When they evidence an uncommon Degree of Joy, at the Sight of some, and as high Displeasure at the Sight of others. And in short, when they conform their Actions and Behaviour, according as the various Exigences of Things seem to require.* One would be apt to think, *Crites*, that these Actions depended on two very different Principles: And that what enabled a Dog, a Horse, or an Elephant to learn the Lessons that are taught them, could not be the same *Instinct*, which directs a Duckling to the Water, and a Chicken to avoid it.

And I beg leave to observe, *Crites*, that I cannot conceive, what one vertuous End it can answer, to suppose Mankind the very lowest Class of all Beings that are endued with Reason, to deprive poor Brute Animals of all *Sensations*, *Perceptions*, and *Memory* properly so called, and of all the Power of Self-Motion. — On the contrary, when these Creatures are observed to behave under Variety of Circumstances, just as Reason would itself naturally dictate and prescribe,

* See a very entertaining Tract of *Rorarius*, entitled, *Quod Animalia Bruta Ratione utantur melius Homine.*

and giving plain Indications that they *feel, perceive, remember*, and have a Power of beginning and varying their own Motions at Pleasure; — If notwithstanding this, Men should believe these Animals moved as necessarily as a Clock or a Watch, or as *one Ball struck against another*,* without *knowing* or *understanding* what they did, without being *conscious* of their own Operations, or properly *feeling*, or *perceiving*, or *intending* any Thing; — and that the whole, according to the famous *Descartes*, was only so many *mere Mechanical Motions*, necessarily arising from the present State and Disposition of the Organs, without the least Sign of *Thought* or *Understanding*;† — As this might expose these poor Creatures to greater Hardships, than they labour under at present: So the Consequence might be fatal in respect of Mankind themselves, who might look upon their own Actions and Behaviour in much the same Light, and fancy that, notwithstanding all Appearances to the contrary, they were as much impelled by necessary Causes, as the Brute-Creation itself.

The great *Descartes* does indeed maintain, that “this Opinion is more pious in Respect of Men, than cruel in regard of Brutes. Because it absolves Mankind from the Suspicion of a Crime, in eating and killing of them.”‡ — But it may be submitted, whether Men do not generally want Arguments to excite them, to use Mercy towards those poor Animals, rather than to have any Scruple of this Sort remo-

* Procedure, p. 395. † Lettres de *Monf. Descartes*, p. 335—338, 361, 362. et Dissertat. de Methodo. p. 44—46.
‡ Lettre 67. p. 338.

ved?—The Truth is, that Great Man had got a very untowardly Hypothesis, and he was willing to make the best of it he could. He does indeed go so far as to allow “it *cannot* be “demonstrated that Brutes do *not* think.”*—I should be glad to be informed, what *one* Demonstration is wanting, that they actually do think, *except only*, as Mr. Locke observes, *telling us they do so*. However what Language they have, though consisting only of Signs, and Motions, and inarticulate Sounds, may speak even This to us plain enough.

But to maintain that what we observe in these Creatures, is *altogether mechanical, devoid of all Thought and Understanding*, looks rather like serving an Hypothesis, than like the natural and unprejudiced Thoughts of such a Genius as *Descartes*.—But I ask pardon, *Crites*, for this Digression.

C. But is it not, as our Author says, —
 “very sure, that if *Brutes* had any Degree of
 “*Reason*, their Sounds would be *articulate* in
 “Proportion to that Degree;—and that
 “every Species of Brutes would speak a Lan-
 “guage of its own, though not so refined and
 “articulate as *Greek and Latin*:—And that
 “if Brutes have Organs fitted for articulate
 “Sounds, then there is nothing to hinder them
 “from *speaking*, but the Want of some Degree
 “of *Reason* within them?”†

P. As we often find *articulate* Sounds, where this Gentleman will not allow the *least* Degree of *Reason*, and on the other hand, frequently miss

* Lettre 67. p. 336. † Procedure, p. 435.

of these Sounds in Children, where neither the *Use of Reason*, nor proper *Organs* are wanting ; — I really think the want of *articulate* Sounds in Brutes, will by no means prove, what the learned Author would prove from it.

C. Mr. *Locke* supposes, that “ Brutes cannot
“ frame any *abstract* or *general Ideas*, that this
“ puts a perfect Distinction betwixt Man and
“ Brutes, and that it is an Excellency, which
“ the Faculties of Brutes do by no means at-
“ tain to: Since they have no Use of Words, or
“ any other general Signs. It is in this, says
“ he, that the Species of *Brutes* are discrimina-
“ ted from Man, and is that proper Difference,
“ wherein they are wholly separated, and which
“ at last widens to so vast a Distance.”*

But our learned Author rightly observes, that “ the Deduction of Consequences is a more
“ *elevated* Work of Reason, than that of ma-
“ king the clearest and most distinct *Idea* or
“ *Conception* we have of any one *Individual*,
“ stand in our Mind, to *represent* the whole *Kind*,
“ which after all metaphysical Nicety is the true
“ Meaning of that hard Word. — So that
“ these Men have unluckily placed the *distin-*
“ *guishing* Character in that particular Instance
“ of Reason, wherein Brutes make the *nearest*
“ Approaches to Man.”†

P. Good *Crites*, let us take a View how se-
vere this learned Writer is upon *these* very Men
in another Place. — “ We may, says he, have
“ leave to wonder at those Persons, who single

* H. Understanding, B. 2. c. 11 § 10, 11.

† Procedure, p. 436—473.

“out this Sort of *imaginary Abstraction*, for the
 “only perfect Distinction between *Men* and
 “*Brutes*, and chuse to place the only Difference
 “between them in that Sort of Abstraction,
 “[the most inconsistent Monster in the World]
 “which one would think could never enter into
 “the Head of *Man* or *Beast*.”* — But yet
 here they have *unluckily* placed this *distinguish-*
ing Character in that particular Instance of Reason,
wherein Brutes make the nearest Approaches to
Man. — But indeed the *Unluckiness* of it is,
Crites, that this Method of Abstraction is the
 learned Author’s, and not *Mr. Locke’s*, and
 therefore it happens that *Mr. Locke* has nothing
 to do with it.

As to the other *imaginary and monstrous Ab-*
straction, we have already sufficiently considered
 it.† But have you any Thing further, *Crites*,
 upon this Subject?

C. I have indeed *Philander*, and perhaps what
 may easily overturn all that can be said for the
Thinking of Brutes.

P. Pray *Crites* let us hear it.

C. You will grant, if they are *mere Matter*,
 that they cannot *think*?

P. Most readily.

C. You will allow the Holy Scriptures to be
 a sufficient Proof? —

P. I am of *Mr. Locke’s* Opinion; — *What-*
ever is divine Revelation ought to overrule all our
Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests. ||

C. Well then our learned Author has proved
 it. —

* Procedure, p. 186—188. † See the third Dialogue.

‡ H. Understanding. B. 4. c. 18. § 10.

P. As how dear *Crites*?

C. He proves it from a Passage, which stands thus translated in our Bibles; — *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man, that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth downward to the Earth?* † “The Opposition in the Original, he observes, is abundantly more full and emphatical; — *Who knoweth the Spirit of the Sons of Men*, that is of Mankind, *which ascendeth itself*, or of itself, *up on high*, and the Spirit of a Beast, *which descendeth itself*, down below to the Earth? That this is the true rendring is evident, and not, *who knoweth whether the Spirit of a Man goeth upward &c.* For, as some learned Men have justly observed, ¶ in the two Participles is not *interrogative*, but *emphatical*. To which, says he, I shall add that there is no small Emphasis in the *Lamed* prefixed, in the Words *Lemabla* and *Lemata*, and that the greatest Emphasis of all is in the Word *Hiab itself* immediately following the two Participles, which evidently confirms the ¶ prefixed to them both to be emphatical.” ||

P. If you look, *Crites*, either into the Criticks, or into *Pool's Synopsis*, you will find various Opinions of the Learned upon this Text. — Some affirming to the same Purpose with that Gentleman, — others of a different Opinion. Whilst there have not been wanting those, who have looked upon this Part of the Chapter, as representing only the Objections of Epicureans and Atheists. — The learned *Mercer* complains, that Men were often willing to take occasion

† Eccles. c. iii. v. 21.

|| Procedure, p. 357, 358.

from

from the Obscurity of some Parts of this Book, to expound it according to their different Fancies, and Inclinations.*

That great Critic differs in Opinion from the learned Author, and will have the π to be rather *interrogative* than *emphatical*.† — And in Case, *Crites*, you have any doubt of the Abilities of *Mercer*, in judging of an *Hebrew* Text, if any Credit can be given to *Scaliger*, he was by the Confession of the *Jews* themselves, one of the greatest *Hebricians* that ever was.‡ And whose uncommon Skill in that Language, as well as penetrating Judgment in examining the Difficulties of Scripture, are amply attested to, by that famous Critic *F. Simon*.§ — So that upon the whole I cannot help thinking, but that the Proof of Brutes being *mere Matter*, hangs on a very slender Thread.

C. Well but the learned Author observes, that “ though π should be taken *interrogatively*, “ it alters not the main Scope and Import of the “ Text, though the Expression were *less emphatical*, yet the Doctrine is equally *true*, as well “ as the Consequences drawn from the Text.”**

P. So that whether the critical Remarks are well founded or not, I find it is just the same Thing. — I wonder this Gentleman should take so much Pains to settle this Criticism, when the Text does as well without it, as with it.

C. Indeed he afterwards “ appeals to any Person skilled in *Hebrew*, whether taking the π in-

* See the Prolegomena to Eccles in *Pool's Synopsis*.

† See *Mercer* in loc. — || *Scaligerana*.

‡ Hist. Crit. du V. T. l. 3. c. 14.

** Procedure, p. 363.

interrogatively,

“*terrogatively*, he is able to perfect and compleat the Sense of that Text?” *

P. Well then the Text, I find *Crites*, would do better with it, than without it. Be it so. — Let us suppose every Thing, just as this learned Writer will have it. Let his Criticism be right. — Or whether right or wrong, let the Meaning of that Text be the same. — And though the *Sense* may be *imperfect* and *incomplete*, yet let this make no Difference in the *Doctrine* and *Consequences drawn from it*. — Will it however amount to a clearer Proof that Brutes are *mere Matter*, than can be produced out of the same Book, against some allowed Principles of your own favourite Science? — *The Sun also ariseth, and the Sun goeth down, and hasteth to his Place whence he arose.* †

But you will say that the Scriptures were not designed to teach us Astronomy, since our Salvation no way depends on the Truth of that Science. — It is true, *Crites*, but will you say, that our Salvation is more concerned in knowing that Brute Animals are *mere Matter*? Or that *mere Matter* under such a particular Modification is capable of a certain Kind of *Sensation* and *Perception*? God forbid, that the Materialists should have such Encouragement from Scripture!

Believe me, *Crites*, that Sceptics and Infidels are never better pleased, than when they see the warm Professors of Christianity, proving from the inspired Writings, what they could never be designed to prove. — But thus one Set of Men bring Proofs, that a *Wafer* is a God. — Ano-

* Procedure, p. 363.

† Eccles. ch. i. v. 5.

ther, with a very hard Name,* would prove the Almighty to be of an human Form.—In like manner, a Set of *Holy* Philosophers once maintained against the famous *Galilæo*, that his Astronomy was contrary to Scripture.† — And thus it is proved from the same divine Book that Brute Animals are *mere Matter*. In such manner has that divine System too often been made use of, to support the various Humours, Interests, and Systems of Mankind.—But we should be very careful, *Crites*, how we confound divine Revelation with our own Commentaries and Criticisms, or make the infallible Word of God answerable for the Prejudices of our own Minds.

C. I shall trouble you, *Philander*, no farther, than only to observe, that in my Opinion our Author with great Reason affirms, that the Text before mentioned, and this following, — *The Dust shall return unto the Earth, as it was, and the Spirit shall return to God who gave it,* || —
 “ are a plain and express Revelation of the Im-
 “ materiality of the human Soul, and of the
 “ Materiality of that in Brutes.—He grants
 “ it does not amount to a *Demonstration* for the
 “ Immateriality of the Soul of Man, but that it
 “ is a most express and emphatical *Revelation* of
 “ it, in Opposition to the Soul of Brutes, which
 “ is as expressly declared *material*: It contains
 “ as much plain and genuine Truth, as could
 “ possibly be expressed in so few Words, and is
 “ likewise founded on the highest *moral Certain-*
 “ ty, and you have no more for the Truth of

* Anthropomorphites. † See *Limberch's History of the Inquisition*, Vol. II. B. 2. c. 30. || *Eccles. ch. xii. y. 7.*

“ any

“any Point, either of Natural or Revealed Religion. Though it is such Evidence as doth not *compel* the Assent, yet it is sufficient to render the withholding it, *inexcusable* to God and our own Consciencies.”*

P. And yet *Crites*, notwithstanding all that is here so solemnly affirmed, this learned Author elsewhere informs us, that “what is said concerning the Souls of Brutes, he lays no greater Stress upon, than as being Matter of highly probable Conjecture only, and as what appears to be Truth, and do accordingly, says he, leave [it] to stand or fall, as [it] shall be found more or less agreeable to the natural Sentiments of any Reader, who is yet free to judge for himself, and unbiassed from the Weight of great Names.”† So that this very *Materiality* of the Souls of Brutes, which in one Place is *as plainly and expressly revealed* as the *Immateriality* of the Souls of Men, and which has therefore the same Support with the *Truths of Natural and Revealed Religion*, is here declared to be a *Matter of highly probable Conjecture only*, and left to stand or fall as it should be found more or less agreeable to the natural Sentiments of any Reader. —

I know not which an *unbiassed Reader* may be most surprized at, — whether at the calling that a *plain and express Revelation*, which is at most only a *doubtful Sense of Words*, that are themselves none of the *plainest*, depending on a very *uncertain and laboured Criticism*: — Or at the laying no greater Stress upon a *plain and ex-*

* Procedure, p. 362, 363.

† p. 54.

press Revelation, than as a *Matter of highly probable Conjecture only*.——Though however the learned Author came to deliver himself in this Manner, I am yet thoroughly perswaded he had a much greater Honour for divine Revelation, than to leave it thus precariously *to stand or fall*.

——Whether indeed the Method he has sometimes pursued, can contribute much to the Service of it, is undoubtedly another Question.

——If frequent *Mistakes*, and many *harsh Words*, if *unkind Insinuations*, *obscure Arguments*, and a *great Deal of Warmth*, can promote the Honour and Interest of Religion, either Natural or Revealed, it must be allowed this Gentleman has effectually promoted them.

And as he charges some anonymous Writer with *Expressions of a Feverish burning Zeal*, which are *not according to Knowledge*, for the Doctrine of the Gospel,*——So I would beg of you to reflect, how very unbecoming such Zeal is in itself, and how very fatal in its usual Tendency and Consequences——and withal, whether the learned Author has not himself discovered some plain Symptoms of that very *Zeal*, which he thus condemns in the Writings of another.

C. I return you many Thanks, *Philander*, for the Trouble I have given you, and do bid you heartily farewell.

P. Farewell, good *Crites*.

* Introduction, p. 20.

F I N I S.

